



If there is one thing American criminal law scholars agree on, it is that our justice 
system suffers from overcriminalization.  Our codes criminalize too much conduct; 
outdated offenses remain too long on the books, and legislatures cannot resist adding 
new crimes and harsher punishments.  This is so because criminal law is a distinctive 
issue for legislative debate and for democratic politics generally.  Few lobby against 
crime creation; legislators respond to strong majoritarian preferences that make votes 
against crime creation—or votes to repeal antiquated crimes—politically implausible.  
Thus criminal law is “one-way ratchet”: it expands but doesn’t contract.  On this 
account, criminal law is a challenge for democratic governance, because criminal law is 
the product of structural failures in political processes. 
 Yet this story fails to account for much of American criminal law policy and 
practice.  In fact, legislatures decline to enact bills proposing new crimes or increased 
punishments every year.  They repeal longstanding criminal statutes and reduce 
punishments.  Interest groups and popular opinion often support and sometimes drive 
these reforms, which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of ever-
increasing harshness and that democratic processes can accurately respond to that 
sentiment.  Legislatures criminalize very little conduct that most people think should be 
completely unregulated, and unpopular or silly offenses left on the books are routinely 
nullified by democratically accountable prosecutors or narrowed by courts.  As a result, 
criminal law’s reach into most citizens’ lives is almost surely less in most respects than in 
the past.  
More than ninety percent of criminal law enforcement is state rather than federal, 
and state criminal justice systems on the whole more democratically responsive than the 
federal system.  Many state legislatures recently have proven better at devising 
procedural frameworks to harness expertise in the reform of criminal law and 
punishment policy and to moderate risks of dysfunctional policymaking.  Coupled with 
restraints from other branches, substantive overcriminalization, judged against a 
baseline of democratic preferences, is a modest problem in the states.  And what 
overcriminalization exists has little effect on criminal justice’s well recognized problems 
such as excessive plea bargaining, racial disparities, and high incarceration rates. 
 
* Alumni Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.  Special thanks to Rachel 
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2Rethinking Overcriminalization 
If there is one thing American criminal law scholars agree on, it is that our justice 
system suffers from overcriminalization.  Our codes criminalize too much conduct; 
outdated offenses remain too long on the books, and legislatures cannot resist adding new 
crimes and harsher punishments.  There is also broad agreement on the reasons for this 
pattern.  Criminal law is a distinctive issue for legislative debate and for democratic 
politics more generally.  New offenses are cost-free, and few plausible groups lobby 
against crime creation; legislators respond to strong majoritarian preferences that make 
votes against crime creation and punishment increases—or votes to repeal antiquated 
crimes—politically implausible.  Thus criminal law, in the recurrent metaphor, is “one-
way ratchet”: it expands but doesn’t contract.  As a consequence we are moving “ever 
closer to a world in which the law on the books makes everyone a felon.”1 This story 
poses a challenge to democratic governance, because it suggests that criminal law is the 
product of structural failures in political processes.  Legislative processes not only cannot 
cool the passions of the electorate in the service of rational social policy,2 they may 
exaggerate those passions.  A considerable body of prominent criminal law scholarship in 
the last decade has either focused on this problem or taken it for granted and explored its 
causes and implications.3
1 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511 (2001), quoted 
in Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 
Hastings L.J. 633, 638 (2005) (hereafter Degradation), and in Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law 
Important?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 261, 267-68 (2003) (suggesting “[t]his allegation may be understated”), 
and in Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 32 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, 769 (2004) (hereinafter Crimes).  
2 See, e.g., Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 83 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
3 See Symposium: Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 541 (2005) (articles by 
Ellen S. Podgor, John S. Baker, John Hasnas, Peter J. Henning, Erik Luna, Sara Sun Beale, Geraldine Szott 
Moohr and Paul Rosenzweig); Donald Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver:  A Survey of 
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1155 (2005); Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1; 
Douglas Husak, Crimes, supra note 1, at 769; Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost 
Everything (Gene Healy ed. 2004); Stuntz, supra note 1; Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1; Paul 
Rosenzweig, The Overcriminalization of Social and Economic Conduct (Heritage Foundation Legal 
Memorandum 2003); John S. Baker, Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Criminal Legislation 
(2004) (report sponsored by Federalist Society) available at www.fed-soc.org; Am. Bar Ass’n, The 
Federalization of Criminal Law 7-11 (1997) (concluding that more than 40% of federal criminal statutes 
were enacted in the last thirty years) ; Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: 
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 (1997); David A.J. 
Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law: An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization (1982) .  
This complaint has some history.  See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 
Annals Am Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 157 (1967). 
3This story contains some truth, but it also fails to account for much of American 
criminal law policy and practice.  In fact, legislatures decline to enact bills proposing new 
crimes or increased punishments every year, for reasons familiar to students of legislative 
process.  Legislators sometimes repeal longstanding criminal statutes, reduce 
punishments, reduce offense severity, and occasionally convert crimes to civil 
infractions.  Moreover, interest groups and popular opinion often support and sometimes 
drive these reforms, which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of 
ever-increasing harshness and that democratic processes can accurately respond to that 
sentiment—even when, as in the case of consensual sex crimes, popular sentiment is not 
uniform.  Legislatures criminalize very little conduct that most people think should be 
completely unregulated, and they sometimes reduce punishments for widely endorsed 
offenses.  And what offenses legislatures leave on the books, democratically accountable 
prosecutors often nullify in practice: many of the crimes scholars complain about are 
rarely prosecuted. 
Part I of the article unpacks the overcriminalization literature to identify several 
distinct complaints—duplicate offenses, prohibition of trivial or innocuous conduct, 
federalization of state crime, and the related problem of excessive punishment.  Despite 
these facts, however, there is little criminalization of wholly innocent conduct, save for 
(a) trivial offenses that are almost never enforced and (b) pockets of federal practice.  
Further, criminal law’s substantive scope is almost surely narrower in most respects than 
in the past, at least in its effect on most citizens.  Part II maps the biggest reasons for this: 
legislatures have long histories and continuing practices of abolishing crimes, narrowing 
offense definitions and moderating punishments that contrast with their creation of new 
offenses and harsher sanctions.  Legislators also routinely decline proposals for new 
crimes or greater punishments; in criminal law as in other policy areas, most bills fail.  
On this account, criminal law is not a one-way ratchet of ever-increasing severity driven 
by law-and-order politics or flawed democratic institutions.  It looks instead more like 
other policy debates that often have high public salience—tax policy, for example—but 
on which public and interest-group pressures occasionally shift and legislators have 
multiple means of response or avoidance. 
4Documenting this pattern generates a revised account of how well democratic 
processes structure and execute criminal law, and it brings to light an important 
distinction.  State legislatures are, on the whole, better at criminal law than Congress.  
And state prosecutors are much more politically accountable than their federal 
counterparts.  Those facts make state criminal justice systems on the whole more 
democratically responsive than the federal system.  That matters because more than 
ninety percent of criminal law enforcement is state rather than federal.4
Overcriminalization concerns focused on federal law paint a misleading picture: the 
problem in worse in the federal realm than in most states.  Part III draws on legislation 
scholarship to explain why.  State legislatures operate under very different procedures 
and norms than Congress, and recently many have proven better at devising procedural 
frameworks to harness expertise in the reform of criminal law and punishment policy.  
All policymaking faces familiar risks of translating public preferences into policy, of 
majorities trampling minority interests, and of concentrated interests that succeed over 
broad, diffuse interests.  But in many state legislatures, procedural frameworks—
analogous to those Congress devised for a range of issues but never for substantive 
criminal law reform5—moderate the greatest risks of dysfunctional criminal 
policymaking.  Part IV extends the picture of criminal law’s democratic structure.  Direct 
election of most state prosecutors additionally checks criminal law’s reach: even statutes 
that legislatures ill-advisedly pass (or fail to repeal once antiquated) are functionally 
nullified by local prosecutors whose priorities are governed by local politics and tight 
budgets.  Courts supplement this constraint, especially in the area of speech and 
expressive-conduct crimes.  These constraints explain why substantive 
overcriminalization is a modest problem in the states, and why it is a bigger problem in a 
small subset of federal criminal law. 
 
4 Less than 5 percent of all prosecutions are federal and less than 10 percent of all inmates are in federal 
prisons or jails.  In 2003, the federal prisons and jails held 165,800 inmates, while state prisons and jails 
held 1,912,800.  On those numbers, federal prisoners account for about 8 percent of the nation’s inmates in 
2003.  Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook for Criminal Justice Statistics—2003, 
at tbl. 6.2.  As for prosecutions, there were 66,452 federal criminal cases filed in 2002, while there were 
1,051,000 felony convictions in state courts the same year; federal cases equal 6.3 of that state figure, which 
excludes misdemeanors and felony charges not yielding conviction.  Id. at tbls. 5.10 & 5.44. 
5 An arguable exception is the unsuccessful National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 
(a.k.a. the Brown Commission), which issued its report on overhauling the federal code in 1971 to no 
effect. 
5The upshot of this account is, first, that it is not clear there is much 
overcriminalization at all.  Overcriminalization is a normative judgment, and the baseline 
for judgments about excessive offense definitions and sentencing levels, I argue, should 
be democratic preferences.  Judged by that standard, the patterns of substantive criminal 
law contraction and expansion in recent decades reflect a plausible set of preferences we 
could roughly describe as favoring expanded personal freedom combined with harsher 
sanctions for harmful or risky conduct.  America’s singularly severe punishment policies 
can be criticized on many grounds but on the whole accord roughly with majoritarian 
preferences, qualified by the recognition that preferences are dependent on imperfect 
information and the cognitive frames of prevailing practices, and that particular 
applications may be outside those preferences.6 Second, democratic governance works 
surprisingly well in many respects for defining criminal law, roughly as well as it does 
for most other areas of social policy.  Finally, and as discussed in the concluding Part, 
what overcriminalization exists has relatively little to do with many of criminal justice’s 
most pressing problems, such as excessive plea bargaining, racial disparities, and high 
incarceration rates. 
 
I. Criminalization Complaints 
Criticisms of overcriminalization capture several distinct complaints about the 
general growth of substantive criminal law.  One is simply that codes have grown.  
Studies of the federal code document its dramatic growth in the last four decades,7 and 
nearly every state code has expanded as well.  As a rough measure of representative 
growth in state codes, Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill note that the Illinois Code went 
from less than 24,000 words in 1961 to 136,000 in 2003—a six-fold increase.8 Bill 
 
6 For insightful, contrasting accounts of American cultural preferences for harsh sanctions, see James Q. 
Whitman, Harsh Justice:  Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe 
(2003); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001).  
For evidence and arguments that some sentencing policies depart from majoritarian preferences, see, e.g., 
Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame (presenting empirical data on public views 
of appropriate sentencing levels); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You are Out, but 
Why? The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 L. & Society Rev. 237 (1997); 
Stuntz, supra note 1, at 549 & 595. 
7 See Baker, supra note 3; Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3. 
8 Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from 
Themselves?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 169, 172 & n.16 (2003). 
6Stuntz found that, over the past 150 years, Virginia’s code grew from 170 to 495 
offenses, and Massachusetts’ from 214 to 535.9
Those numbers are suggestive but tell us little about the merits of that expansion.  
Some may be good; circumstances change, and law must adjust—we had little need for 
computer crimes forty years ago.  Scholars mainly stress two detrimental types of 
criminal law growth.  One is redundancy—multiple statutes that criminalize the same 
conduct in slightly different or more specific ways, often with varying punishments.  
Specific statutes within a jurisdiction are often redundant of moral general ones, and 
much federal law is redundant of state offenses (over-federalization).  The federal 
carjacking statute is a frequently cited example,10 though scholars have cited many 
others—offenses of damaging specific kinds of property that duplicate a general 
property-damage statute,11 specific theft offenses that duplicate a general theft 
definition,12 and perhaps hundreds of federal fraud and false-statement offenses.13 
Other overcriminalization arguments complain of overbreadth—statutes that 
criminalize conduct that most people believe to be innocent, innocuous or trivial.  
Frequent examples of this type include the federal misdemeanors against unauthorized 
use of Smokey the Bear’s image or against disturbing mud in a cave on federal land and a 
long list of obscure, often comical state misdemeanors.14 Outdated morals offenses 
 
9 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 514. 
10 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) (felony of taking a motor vehicle by force or intimidation “with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury”).  See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenonmenon, 54 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 703, 708 (2005) (calling this statute “superfluous” because it “deal[s] with conduct addressed by 
existing provisions”); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 610 & n.88 (2005) (noting 
carjacking statute); Sara Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to 
Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 755-56 & n.31 (2005) (noting carjacking statute); Robinson & 
Cahill, supra note 8, at 171 (same).  Robinson and Cahill, who have spent more time than anyone analyzing 
state criminal codes, note other examples of redundancy.  In addition to a general theft offense, for 
example, the Illinois legislature (like others) has specific theft offenses for theft of delivery containers, 
library materials, and other specified forms of property.  See id. at 170 & nn.4-6 (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/16-1 (general theft), 5/16E-3(a) (retail theft), 5/16B-2(a) (library) (1993)). 
11 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 170 (citing Illinois statutes barring damage to library materials, 
animal facilities, delivery  containers and “anhydrous ammonia equipment”). 
12 Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1, at 637 &n.16 (citing duplicative theft provisions in Illinois 
and Kentucky). 
13 Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 249, 
289 (1998) (counting 325 federal fraud or misrepresentation offenses); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 517 (noting 
“100 separate misrepresentation offenses” in the federal code). 
14 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 4302(1), 4302(5), 4306(a)(1), 4306(b) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2000) 
(misdemeanor for unauthorized use of “Smokey the Bear” name); see also Douglas Husak, Retribution in 
7against adultery, fornication, and sodomy fit this category, as well as some gambling and 
alcohol offenses15 and crimes targeting outdated social problems such as railroad 
trespass.16 Especially in federal law, some such crimes are more serious and carry 
substantial penalties.  Expansive use of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to cover even 
breaches of fiduciary duty are notable examples.17 
Complaints about these two main types of crime expansion are relate to other, 
ancillary concerns, such as code disorganization—many new provisions are scattered 
throughout statute books, outside of the criminal code.  They are sometimes poorly 
drafted, which can lead to doctrinal incoherence such as inconsistent use of mens rea 
terms, and to distributive injustice when comparable conduct is charged under similar 
statutes that yield different sentences.18 Finally, a separate but related complaint 
addresses not crimes but sentences: even for appropriately defined crimes, punishment 
levels can be excessive.  Interestingly, complaints about overcriminalization extend back 
at least to the 1960s (versions of the argument occur even earlier),19 when incarceration 
rates were a fraction of current levels,20 the death penalty was in full desuetude, and 
federal criminal law not yet expanded in narcotics and other state-regulated offenses 
 
Criminal Theory, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 959, 962-63 (2000) (citing these two statutes).  See also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 711a (2000) (unauthorized use of Woodsy Owl image); 18 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (unauthorized use of Red 
Cross emblem).  See Green, supra note 3, at 1610-14 (describing and defending the federal crime, created 
by statute and regulation, that punishes sellers who remove mattress tags before sale).  For lists of odd state 
offenses, see Luna, supra note 10, at 704; Stuntz, supra note 1, at 516-17. 
15 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 10, at 750-53 (describing state morals legislation a form of 
overcriminalization).  Morals offenses are the focus of David A.J. Richards’ book-length critique of 
overcriminalization, Sex Drugs and Death: An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization (1982).  
This complaint is at least a generation old.  See Kadish, supra note 3, at 159-65 (criticizing morals 
legislation). 
16 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 556 & n.185 (citing Virginia’s many railroad-specific crimes).  The failure of 
legislatures to repeal outdated statutes was a central concern of Guido Calebresi, A Common Law for the 
Age of Statutes (1982). 
17 See John C. Coffee Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: Restoration of the Public-Private Distinction, 35 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 427 (1995); John C. Coffee Jr. Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Civil and Criminal Models and 
What Can be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875 (1992) (hereafter Paradigms Lost); John C. Coffee Jr., 
Does Unlawful Mean Criminal? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 
71 B.U.L. Rev. 193 (1991) (hereinafter Tort/Crime). 
18 See Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1; Paul H. Robinson et al., Five Worst (and Five Best) 
American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. L. Rev. 1 (2000). 
19 See infra text at nn. 208-13. 
20 But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population Rates 
in Empirical Research?, (January 2006 draft) available at ssrn.com/abstract_id=880129 (suggesting 
“confinement” rates have held steady over the last century if we aggregrate prison and mental hospital 
populations). 
8central to current overcriminalization critiques.21 Nonetheless, there is much to this 
punishment criticism.  Every state and the federal government have added severe 
mandatory minimum punishments in recent decades,22 federal sentencing guidelines 
increased sentences for many crimes,23 and some jurisdictions eliminated parole or 
restricted other mechanisms for early release.24 As a result, American incarceration rates 
skyrocketed over the last three decades to levels that now far outpace those in any other 
western or democratic nation.25 
Redundancy and overbreadth have several potential ill effects, but they are largely 
distinct effects.  Overbreadth inappropriately criminalizes normatively legitimate 
conduct.  That unnecessarily infringes liberty, and it increases police and prosecutorial 
power by providing more grounds for arrest and conviction.  Redundancy, by definition, 
does not expand criminal law’s scope; it “re-criminalizes” conduct already prohibited, 
and most examples point to conduct that is appropriately barred—theft, assault, fraud and 
the like.26 Courts have a few means to control prosecutor manipulation of the charge 
options created by overlapping offenses, through concurrent sentencing, merging 
offenses, and rules mandating that specific statutes supercede general ones or those with 
 
21 See Kadish, supra note 3; Herbert Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction 249-95 (1968); Sanford H. 
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1963). 
22 For description and criticism, see, e.g., Paul Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (and a Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (2004); Marc 
Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 9, 11 (1999); Gary T. 
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing 
Reform, 81 Cal. L.Rev. 61 (1993). 
23 See U.S. Sent. Commission, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the 
Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration and 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining 378-81 (1991) (reporting that federal sentences nearly 
doubled between 1984 and 1990 with the adoption of the guidelines and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986); 
Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?, The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal 
Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 24 (1997). 
24 A majority of states still have parole in some form.  For a comprehensive list of state parole laws, see 
Taylor Menlove, Parole and Truth-in-Sentencing State Survey (memo on file with the author). 
25 American incarceration levels now stand at about 700 inmates per 100,000 population.  From 1900 to 
1970, the U.S. rate was about 110 per 100,000, a rate roughly equal to the current highest national 
incarceration rates in Western Europe.  See Roy Walmsley, United Kingdom Home Office Research, 
Development and Statistics Directorate, World Prison Population List 1, 5 (3d ed. 2002).  Yet U.S. prison 
populations rose as mental hospital confinements declined, so overall involuntary confinement has held 
fairly constant.  See Harcourt, supra note 20. 
26 One exception is offense definitions, such as the federal mail fraud statute, that are broad enough to 
capture both clear wrongdoing and more marginal or morally ambiguous conduct.  See Coffee, Tort/Crime, 
supra note 17. 
9lesser punishments for the same conduct trump more severe ones.27 But those doctrines 
are fairly weak, and redundant crimes, especially if coupled with sentencing variations 
for similar offenses, can also increase enforcement officials’ power.  Expansive 
substantive law undermines criminal procedure restrictions, because more crimes mean 
more bases for police to find probable cause to stop and arrest, and redundant crimes give 
prosecutors more power to choose statutes with easier proof requirements, to punish the 
same conduct multiple times, to effectively choose punishments when similar statutes 
carry different penalties, and thereby to gain bargaining leverage by increasing risks of 
trial.28 That bargaining leverage leads to plea bargains inappropriately replacing trials 
and may play a role in wrongful convictions.29 Specifying these alleged effects of 
overcriminalization is important, because I argue in the final Part that overbreadth—
criminalizing innocent or innocuous conduct—has little effect in practice, save for small 
subsets of federal prosecution; most claims of excessive criminalization relate to offenses 
that are trivial and rarely enforced.  Likewise, redundancy probably plays a lesser role in 
adding to prosecutorial power and plea bargains than commonly assumed. 
One feature of this debate merits emphasis.  While many complaints about 
overcriminalization point to state codes, much critical literature focuses on federal 
 
27 See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4, 596 S.E.2d 147 (2004) (holding defendant could be punished only 
under statute for misdemeanor statutory rape, not felony child molestation, due to lenity doctrines dictating 
that specific statutes trump general ones and lesser punishments prevail over greater ones).  Such doctrines 
are of limited reach; prosecutors can sometimes avoid court supervision of this type by charging only the 
more severe offense, rather than multiple, overlapping offenses. 
28 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale 
L.J. 1 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process and the Civil-Criminal  Line, 7 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 1 (1996) (hereafter Civil-Criminal Line).  The recognition that wide-ranging criminal laws 
encourage and facilitate abusive enforcement discretion is not entirely new; scholars and activists raised 
similar arguments against morals crimes in the first several decades of the twentieth century.  See, e.g., 
Edwin M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy: Abortion, Homosexuality 
and Drug Addiction 79-80 (1965) (arguing antihomosexuality laws “encourage[] … police corruption and 
repressive enforcement procedures”); William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 
1920-1980, 5 Yale J.L. & Hum. 265, 280 (1993); Packer, supra note 21, at 328-31 (“police corruptions is 
closely associated with … vice control” and arguing use of police “decoys” as an enforcement strategy 
against prostitution is “disgusting”). 
29 Cf. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 79 (2005) (proposing a measure of excessive plea bargaining, discussing wrongful conviction risks 
and attributing causal effect to prosecutorial power but not overcriminalization); William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548 (2004).  
10
criminal law.  A few critiques focus exclusively on federal criminal law,30 and nearly all 
include federal law as dominant (often recurrent) examples of each form of the 
problem,31 whether it be excessive punishment or criminalization of the trivial behavior 
and conduct best left to civil regulation.32 This distinction is important, because 
overcriminalization is worse in the federal context: its costs are greater there and its 
amelioration less likely. 
Scholars explain overcriminalization largely with an account of legislative failure 
and democratic process dysfunction.  Legislatures treat criminal law differently from 
most other topics of public policy—proposals for new crimes and increased punishments 
pass legislatures more easily than other types of legislation, while repeal or reform of 
crimes and punishment face unusually long odds for enactment.  This is so, scholars 
argue, for understandable reasons: majority preferences lean strongly and consistently in 
favor of expanded offenses and more severe punishment.  Interest group influences work 
strongly in one direction: prosecutors are especially effective lobbyists for criminal law 
expansion33 and other interest groups lobby for specific crimes; shippers, for instance, 
seek a special theft-of-delivery-container offense for conduct covered by a general theft 
definition.34 High-profile crimes prompt legislatures to react with redundant statutes, and 
there is little downside to doing so.  Rarely does an interest group of significant influence 
emerge to counter the influence of prosecutors, and legislatures can enact new crimes 
cost-free—they need not repeal old ones or appropriate tax dollars.  (Importantly, that is 
not true with sentencing increases; incarceration costs a lot of money, and that constrains 
 
30 See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 3; Baker, supra note 3; ABA Report, supra note 3; Green, supra note 3; 
cf. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 10 (arguing expansive federal criminal law is a key factor in making 
pretextual prosecutions a bigger problem in federal than state law enforcement). 
31 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 555-65; Luna, supra note 10; Beale, supra note 10, at 753-73.  Paul 
Robinson’s work is an exception; he has devoted much exclusive attention to state criminal codes.  See, 
e.g., Robinson, supra note 18. 
32 For arguments about the appropriateness of non-criminal regulation for conduct governed by criminal 
statutes, see, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil 
Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1802 (1992) (arguing for “the shrinking of the criminal law in order to fit it into 
its proper role in the law of sanctions, next to an expanding arena of punitive civil sanctions.”); Green, 
supra note 3, at 1610; Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 28; Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 17; 
Coffee, Tort/Crime, supra note 17; Packer, supra note 21, at 249-95. 
33 See Stuntz, supra note 1; Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 U.C.L.A. 715, 728-29 (2005); 
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 587- 88 (2002) (describing prosecutors’ strong lobbying influence in Congress on 
criminal justice legislation). 
34 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, at 637 & n.16 (citing this example in Illinois). 
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sentencing policy.)  All these elements make criminal justice a singular case in legislative 
process: criminal law expands unusually easily, and its contraction is unusually difficult. 
The growth in raw numbers of offenses-on-the-books is undeniable, but this story 
leaves out much about criminal law’s substantive evolution in recent decades, and it 
conflicts with much of what we know about legislative process.  Criminal law has 
contracted in important respects in the last century thanks in large part to legislatures, 
and small-scale reforms continually occur in contemporary legislatures.  That record 
reveals a picture of criminal law as a topic of much more ordinary fate in legislatures than 
scholars often suggest.  And legislative adjustments are supplemented by prosecutorial 
and judicial restraints on criminal law’s reach that bring criminal law in closer alignment 
with democratic preferences.  Code expansion occurs at the same time, but the 
combination of these effects is fairly viewed not so much as overcriminalization as an 
ongoing reformulation of criminal justice policy that roughly tracks changes in 
majoritarian preferences or social movement influence, overlaid with ordinary amounts 
(relative to other public policy topics) of legislative imperfection in defining and abiding 
by those preferences. 
 
II. Legislatures and Criminal Law 
A. Criminal law’s stability. 
One expects the core of substantive criminal law to remain fairly static.  Core 
crimes against persons, property, and the state are nearly universally criminalized over 
time.  These include varieties of battery, homicide, intimidation, trespass, theft, robbery 
and fraud as well as bribery, perjury and other conduct that undermines public 
institutions.  But we also expect change outside this core, and to some degree within it, 
with technological and social change.  Treating horse theft especially harshly made sense 
when horses were more socially valuable; later, we expect to see offenses tailored for 
auto theft.  Offenses must be updated for harassment by telephone and trespass via 
computer networks.  Batteries that were once not criminalized—against spouses and 
children, for instance—become criminalized with changes in social mores that condemn 
domestic violence.  Odd offenses—against organized cock fighting or dog fighting, say—
may be plausible when those practices arise but majorities disapprove.  Moreover, 
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punishment polices vary over time as social beliefs in deterrence, rehabilitation, dignitary 
interests or alternative sanctions change.35 In England, all felons once faced the death 
penalty;36 many non-murderers formerly did in the United States. 
Those shifts notwithstanding, more criminal law change occurs with respect to 
conduct for which the harm is more diffuse or contestable (especially when the victim is 
a voluntary participant), and when society has other, clear policy options for addressing 
disfavored conduct beyond criminal law.  Examples here include consensual sex crimes, 
alcohol policy, gambling regulation, drug usage, sexually explicit media, the time and 
place of market transactions, and speech against state policies or officials. 
These kinds of criminal law reform are not merely sporadic examples scattered 
over two centuries of history.  Contemporary legislatures abolish crimes, reduce 
punishments, and decline to enact new criminal statutes with some regularity.  Of course, 
the first two moves should be less common than the third; it is always harder for 
legislatures to pass bills than to fail to do so.  Inaction is nonetheless suggestive, because 
one premise of overcriminalization scholarship is that crime creation and punishment 
increases have a distinctly easy time overcoming familiar hurdles to legislative success. 
B. The evolution of substantive criminal law. 
A long view of criminal law’s evolution reveals a dramatic contraction of its 
scope, even as it has expanded in some areas.  Colonial criminal law had a breadth and 
severity unimaginable now.  A son who disobeyed his parents could face the death 
penalty; failing to attend church, working on Sundays (or even kissing one’s spouse on 
the Sabbath) were all crimes, as were the familiar range of consensual sexual offenses, 
bearing children out of wedlock, cursing, or failing to work on other days other than 
Sunday.37 The more relevant comparisons, however, are to more recent history.  Taking 
as a baseline the period around the turn of the twentieth century, we find both widespread 
patterns of decriminalization throughout the last several decades and thereby a strong 
argument that criminal law’s reach into citizens’ lives is substantially less than it was less 
than a century ago, in large part due to legislative action.  
 
35 See Garland, supra note 6; Whitman, supra note 6. 
36 See generally Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century England (1991). 
37 See Lawrence Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 31-58 (1993). 
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 Consensual sex was a topic of widespread criminalization in the Progressive era 
around the turn of the twentieth century.38 In that era every state criminalized sodomy 
and many criminalized non-marital, consensual sex and adultery, sometimes at the felony 
level, and even some sexual conduct by married couples.39 But consensual sex has been 
an equally active topic for decriminalization since the early 1970s, largely by legislative 
repeal.  Illinois repealed its sodomy law in 1962.  Connecticut did so in 196740 (two years 
after it unsuccessfully argued for the constitutionality of its criminal ban on contraception 
distribution in Griswold v. Connecticut).  Between 1971 and 2001, legislatures in twenty-
five states and the District of Columbia followed suit.41 (In another ten states, state 
supreme courts held that sodomy statutes violated state constitutions.42 In none of those 
states did legislatures succeed in amending state constitutions to allow sodomy 
prohibitions.)  That widespread trend toward decriminalization left only 15 jurisdictions 
with sodomy statutes on the books at the time Lawrence v. Texas43 declared such statutes 
unconstitutional.  And that trend occurred despite the statutes’ rare use against consensual 
sex (which might generate public disapproval) and despite their utility for prosecutors in 
sexual assault cases that are difficult to prove under more appropriate rape or assault 
statutes.44 
Comparably, Congress, states and localities in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries also widely criminalized expressive conduct, especially when 
 
38 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet 328-51 (1999) (collecting 
early state and local  criminal laws regulating sexual conduct, many of which were enacted in the years 
before and after the turn of the twentieth century); Joanna Grossman Separated Spouses, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 
1613, 1625-26 (2001); see also Robert W. Haney, Comstockery in America (1960) (history of the 
movement  for censorship and other morals legislation). 
39 See, Eskridge, supra note 38, at 328-37 (listing state sodomy laws); Richard A. Posner & Katharine B. 
Silbaugh, A Guide to America’s Sex Laws 65-71 & 98-110 (1996) (listing state sodomy, fornication and 
adultery laws as of 1996); see, e.g., Va. Code § 18.2-361 (defining oral and anal sex as felonies without 
regard to martial status of offenders). 
40 Friedman, supra note 37, at 345, citing Laws Conn. 1967, p.1618. 
41 American Civil Liberties Union, Crime and Punishment in America: State-by-State Breakdown of 
Existing Laws and Repeals (June 2003), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/crimjustice/11982res20030609.html. See also W. Eskridge, supra note 38, at 328-
51 (listing dates of repeal of sodomy and other sexual-conduct crimes); Posner & Silbaugh, supra note 39, 
at 65-71 (listing all states’ statute, or lack of statute, governing sodomy).  Nevada proved particularly 
amenable to change in this period: it enacted its sodomy statute in 1977 and repealed it in 1993.  See id.; 
1977 Nev. Stats. p. 1632, Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.193 (sodomy statute enacted in 1977); see also 1993 Nev. 
Stats. p. 518 (repealing Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.193). 
42 ACLU, Crime and Punishment in America, supra note 41. 
43 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
44 See Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1520 (1989). 
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sexually suggestive (including lewd dress and cross-dressing) but also when overtly 
political.  At the height of World War I, Congress severely criminalized speech critical of 
the U.S. government with the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.45 The 
statutes made it a felony offense to, among other things, use “disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States government, flag, or armed 
forces.46 Yet in the wake of the war’s end, Congress repealed most of the statutes’ 
provisions.47 Congress and federal officials also barred explicit or obscene publications.  
Film and book censorship, mostly focused on obscene and immoral content, was 
aggressively enforced in many jurisdictions in the 1920s and 1930s through criminal 
prosecutions as well as civil actions; targets famously included such novels as Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover, An American Tragedy, and Candide.48 Those activities were also 
decriminalized in the latter part of the twentieth century through a mix of legislative and 
judicial action.  Contemporary examples of jurisdictions seeking to regulate obscene and 
explicit conduct or media—especially outside of child pornography—pale in comparison 
to such regulation 75 years ago, even though First Amendment doctrine provides some 
(much diminished) basis for such restrictions.49 
One finds the same pattern with respect to criminalization of contraception, which 
was prohibited or restricted by federal law and in a patchwork of states a century ago.50 
(Merely advocating repeal of laws restricting contraception could result in criminal 
conviction for “breach of the peace.”)51 But by the time of Griswold v. Connecticut, most 
 
45 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219. 
46 Eugene Debs, among others, was famously sentenced to ten years in prison under these provisions.  The 
statute’s constitutionality was affirmed in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
47 Portions of the statute remain at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794. 
48 See Paul S. Boyer, Purity in Print: The Vice-Society Movement and Book Censorship in America (1968); 
Nelson, supra note 28, at 266-75; Friedman, supra note 37, at 350-54 (recounting examples of works that 
were bases of obscenity prosecutions or bans). 
49 See Friedman, supra note 37, at 350-54 (describing changes in obscenity regulation and attributing 
liberalization to popular culture shifts); W. Eskridge, supra note 38, at 338-41 (collecting municipal sex 
offense ordinances 1850-1950); id. at 174-204 (describing evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence that 
broadened conceptions of protected liberty and autonomy). 
50 See Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 39 Cornell L.Q. 275, 275-
79 (1964) (collecting state and federal laws restricting contraception devices); Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1461-62 (1958), 38 Stat. 194 (1913), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1958) (criminalizing distribution of obscene 
materials and distribution of contraceptive devices in federal enclaves and through the mail). 
51 See People v. Swasey,  180 N.Y.S. 629 (Ct. Gen. Sessions N.Y. County 1920) (conviction for advocating 
repeal of anti-contraception laws overturned on other grounds).  See also People v. Morris, 18 N.Y.S. 448 
(App. Div. 2d Dept. 1940) (conviction for distributing literature on venereal disease cures sustained); 
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had been repealed; only Massachusetts restricted contraceptive use with anything like the 
severity of Connecticut’s criminal statute barring use and distribution of contraceptives 
even to married couples.52 A comparable story describes the history of criminal 
miscegenation statutes.  Interracial marriage was criminalized in at least thirty states at 
the midpoint of the twentieth century.  In the fifteen years before the Supreme Court 
declared such statutes unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia,53 half of those states 
repealed their miscegenation bans, a trend the Court noted in support of its decision.54 
(We will note this same pattern below with respect to restrictions on the use of capital 
punishment: state legislative reform led the way for constitutional interpretation 
restricting punishment.)55 
Decriminalization in these areas manifests a trend in public culture that 
legislatures (and courts) often reflect through law reform. We see the same pattern in 
gaming regulation, which is regulated by a mix of criminal and civil statutes.56 Nevada 
prohibited all gambling in 1909; it repealed that prohibition in 1931.57 Others followed 
to lesser degrees.  In the 1930s twenty-one states legalized race tracks and betting on 
races.  In the 1940s and ’50s, most states decriminalized pari-mutuel betting and low-
stakes charity gaming.  By 1996, forty states allowed pari-mutuel betting, thirty-eight 
states had state lotteries, and twenty-six had casinos.58 Gambling is the kind of activity 
that standard theories of legislative process would predict to be a likely candidate for 
decriminalization.  Strong interest groups exist to lobby for legalized gambling, and states 
stands to gain revenue from gaming activity.  Gambling is voluntary, consensual conduct, 
 
People v. Vickers, 19 N.Y.S. 165  (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1940) (conviction for lewd dancing sustained).  For 
a general survey and discussion, see Nelson, supra note 28. 
52 See Comment, supra note 50, at 277-79 (summarizing status of state contraception laws by the early 
1960s); Griswold v. Connecticut, Appellant’s Brief, at n.23 (noting contraceptive devices can be legally 
used and prescribed in 48 of 50 states). 
53 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
54 Id. at 6 & n.5 (listing states that abolished miscegenation crimes); see Walter Wadlington, The Loving 
Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective," 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189 (1966) (only 
16 states still had antimiscegenation laws in 1967). 
55 See infra notes __-__ (discussing Roper, Atkins and Coker as well as earlier legislative constriction of 
death penalty eligibility). 
56 See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: A Guide for Internet Gambling (2001) available at 
http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/InternetAdsGuidelines.html (describing civil and criminal regulations 
governing gambling promotion). 
57 American Gaming Association, 
http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/general_info_detail.cfv?id=12 
58 See id. 
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and government has other means to address the core criminal harms associated with 
gambling, such as control of gaming operations by organized crime groups. 
 National alcohol prohibition, instituted in 1919 with the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment and the Volstead Act (along with similar state statutes criminalizing alcohol 
distribution), was a sweeping criminalization that followed years of local moves to 
criminalize alcohol distribution.59 It was followed, of course, by a sweeping legislative 
decriminalization in 1933 with the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment.60 That 
repeal left alcohol regulation again as a state and local decision, and the trend since the 
1930s has been a steady decline in criminalization, in most respects,61 of alcohol sales 
and use. 
One component of post-Prohibition alcohol law is “blue laws” that restrict alcohol 
sales, often along with other retail activity, and that are often enforced with low-level 
criminal penalties.62 The trend here is similar, and for similar reasons.  Legislative action 
on laws governing Sunday alcohol and retail sales have been uniformly in one direction 
in recent years: deregulation and decriminalization.  Here again we find powerful interest 
groups—alcohol manufacturers and distributors and retail stores—lobbying on the side of 
decriminalization.63 Another class of low-level crimes that some legislatures abandoned 
over the last two decades is minor traffic offenses; several states have rewritten those 
offenses as civil infractions instead of misdemeanors,64 despite the Uniform Vehicle 
 
59 For an overview, see Friedman, supra note 37, at 339-41. 
60 For a history of Prohibition, see David Musto, Drugs in America: A Documentary History (2002). 
61 The prominent exceptions are probably increases in the legal drinking age to 21 and more severe drunk 
driving sanctions.  Both are discussed below at ___. 
62 See, e.g., Va. Code §§ 18.2-341, -342, -343 (criminal components of “blue laws” repealed in 2004); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:171-1.1 9 (criminalizing certain Sunday sales).  
63 See Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S., Sunday Sales, at http://www.discus.org/govt_affairs/sunday/
(listing states in recent years that have relaxed restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales); Clifford J. Levy, 
Drink, Don’t Drink.  Drink, Don’t Drink, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2005 (describing recent alcohol law reforms 
in several states including Kansas); Associated Press, Kansas Liquor Laws May Soon Mirror Most of 
Nation, May 5, 2005 (noting that since 2002, 11 states have repealed Sunday bans on liquor sales), 
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15249; see also David N. Laband & 
Deborah H. Leinbuch, Blue Laws: The History, Economics and Politics of Sunday-Closing Laws, (1987) 
(recounting history and status of blue laws in all states as of 1987). 
64 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Summary of State Speed Laws (5th ed. 2001) 
(collecting state laws, penalties and procedures on speeding and related traffic offenses such as reckless 
driving and racing).  See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §§ 22351, 40000.1, 42001(a) (traffic offenses denoted 
noncriminal infractions); Fla. Code §§ 316.187(3), 316.189(4), 316.1895(9), 316.655, 318.13(3), 318.14(1) 
(speed law violations denoted noncriminal infractions); §625 ILCS 5/16-104 (Illinois speeding violations 
denoted noncriminal petty offenses); Va. Code Ann. §§ 46.2-113, 46.2-878.1, 46.2-878.2 (speeding law 
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Code’s recommendation.65 This is surely an example of decriminalization with broad 
popular support because it involves offenses that most people commit.66 
More serious core crimes are also subject to reform or abolition.  Significantly, 
there is a very strong trend of decriminalizing certain weapons offenses.  Over the last 
two decades, most states have abolished crimes of carrying concealed weapons, which 
often carried felony penalties for repeat offenses.  Currently, only four states still 
criminalize carrying concealed firearms and other weapons.67 The reason for this trend is 
not hard to discern: the National Rifle Association has led a concerted effort to convince 
every state legislature to change the carrying of concealed weapons from a crime to a 
statutory right.  Other groups have opposed these reforms, and public opinion has been 
roughly split in many jurisdictions, yet the NRA’s campaign has met with consistent 
success.68 Similar interest-group dynamics explain the decriminalization that occurred 
when Congress failed to reauthorize the federal assault weapons ban in 2004.69 
The same interest groups also drive legislatures to (modestly) decriminalize other 
conduct through expansion of defenses.  In 2005, Florida enacted a statute—popularly 
labeled the “Stand Your Ground” law—that eliminated any duty for one employing force 
in self-defense to retreat even from public places instead of using force when it is safe to 
do so.70 That change makes legal what was once a criminal use of force.  This reform is 
less meaningful for present purposes but worth noting.  It shows again how powerful 
interest groups sometimes lobby for decriminalization; the NRA pushed the Florida law 
 
violations denoted noncriminal infractions).  For a bibliography on decriminalization of traffic offenses, see 
National Center for State Courts, CourTopics: Traffic Offenses, available at http://www.ncsconline.org. 
65 National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Uniform Vehicle Code (revised 2000), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/enforce/speedlaws501/uvcspeep.pdf. 
66 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (2006) 
(arguing legislatures respond to popular preferences on crimes that affect large segments of the populace). 
67 See Neb. Stat. § 28-1202 (2005); Kan. Stat. § 21-4201 (2005); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1 (2005); Wisc. 
Stat. § 941.23 (2005).  Those making the case for overcriminalization can cite Illinois’s statute, which 
makes it a misdemeanor to carry a “slung-shot.” 
68 For a detailed of this reform process and interest groups’ roles in Missouri, as well as a history of this 
reform trend more broadly, see William T. Horner, Showdown in the Show-Me State: The Fight over 
Conceal-and-Carry Gun Laws in Missouri (2005); see id. at 2 & 7 (noting that a small majority of Missouri 
voters rejected ballot referendum to legalize concealed weapons, and noting public opinion surveys show 
slight majorities in many states oppose decriminalization of concealed weapons).  See also 
http://www.nraila.org (National Rifle Association website). 
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (codifying Title XI of the Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, which expired in Sept. 2004). 
70 Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2005).  For an earlier, similar statute, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5(2). 
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and plans the same campaign in other states.71 It also demonstrates how criminal liability 
can contract even for violent crimes when the debate is framed in a politically appealing 
way. 
 On this latter point, consider how legislatures have explicitly decriminalized other 
core violent conduct.  Intra-family assault and battery was the subject of 
decriminalization for a period in the mid-twentieth century.  In 1962, New York modeled 
a trend of that period among many states when its legislature passed a statute allowing 
domestic violence victims to bring civil actions in family court rather than filing criminal 
complaints (the act required criminal courts to transfer proceedings to the family court), 
so that judicial responses to domestic violence would focus on reconciliation and 
treatment rather than criminal punishment.72 Through the 1960s and 1970s, courts used 
the statute to transfer the full range of violent conduct to a civil forum—burglary, 
weapons, harassment and assault-with-intent-to-commit-incest charges were handled 
civilly.73 The pendulum has swung the other way more recently; we mostly treat 
domestic violence again as a criminal matter.  But the history nonetheless reveals a 
pendulum rather than a one-way ratchet: criminal law ebbs and flows in response to 
public opinion and social movement pressure. 
On top of such broad trends, low-level, modest changes contracting the scope of 
criminal codes appear not to be uncommon.  In 2004, Virginia abolished clearly wrongful 
but rarely prosecuted theft and fraud offenses such as conversion of military property, 
sale of goods of another with failure to pay over proceeds, and overvaluation of property 
for purposes of influencing lending institution74 (as well as sillier ones such as the crime 
of jumping from railroad cars).75 In 2003, Alabama redefined some felony thefts as 
 
71 See NRA Fact Sheet: Fortifying the Right to Self-Defense, at 
http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=188; see also Anthony Sebok, Florida’s New Stand 
Your Ground Law: Why It’s More Extreme, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html. 
72 See Family Court Act, 1962 N.Y. Laws 686; Nelson, supra note 28, at 288-90 (discussing New York’s 
Family Court Act as decriminalization of domestic violence). 
73 People v. Williams, 300 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1969) (burglary and weapons); People v. McCarthy, 398 
N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1977) (harassment); People v. Nuernbereger, 303 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Ct. App. 
1969) (assault with intent to commit incest); Nelson, supra note 28, at 289-91. 
74 Virginia State Crime Commission, The Reorganization and Restructuring of Title 18.2 (House Doc. 15, 
2004), at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/0/efb53246fcf5501a85256ea20046e98f?OpenDocument. 
75 Va. Code § 19.2-161 (repealed 2004). 
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misdemeanors by raising the amount required to make a theft punishable as a felony;76 
Colorado raised amounts for a range of theft and fraud offenses a few years earlier 
(changes that make a rough effort at adjusting crime definitions for inflation).77 Colorado 
also abolished most loitering offenses (preserving only a ban on loitering on school 
grounds), repealed crimes of circulating political material without identifying the 
sponsor, downgraded the status of a harassment-by-stalking offense and reduced 
penalties for some drug offenders.78 A few years earlier, many states lowered the age of 
consent for sex, thereby abolishing the crime of statutory rape when it involved older 
teenagers.79 
Even drug crimes, a dominant category on criminal dockets and the subject of 
expansive criminal legislation and sentencing increases in recent times, have been the 
subject of some reform.  In the last decade, voters in ten states endorsed ballot initiatives 
or referenda decriminalizing the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.80 The effect of 
those changes is constrained because federal law continues to criminalize all marijuana 
use, and federal officials continue to enforce these federal crimes despite state law 
changes and local public sentiment (a telling example of how varying structures of 
democratic institutions can yield different outcomes from the same popular preferences).  
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Raich v. Gonzales,81 state 
decriminalization is largely symbolic; we may see fewer such reforms for that reason.  
But the reforms to date nonetheless demonstrate notable democratic reform for criminal 
law, and other examples will have real effects.  Voters approved 17 of 19 ballot 
initiatives between 1996 and 2002 that either decriminalized some marijuana use, 
reduced drug-possession punishments or mandated related reforms such as limiting asset 
 
76 See Ala. Code § 13A-8-2 through -5 (2005); Ala. Act 2003-355, §1. 
77 See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-4-401, -402, -410, -501; 18-5-205, -206, -702; Colo. H.B. 98-1160 (effective 
July 1998) (raising amounts for fraud crimes). 
78 See Colo. H.B. 97-1077 (effective July 1997) (repealing, inter alia, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-9-112(a)-(c) & 
(e) (loitering crimes), and 1-3-108 (campaign literature), 18-1-106(3)(B)(IV) (harassment); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 18-18-405 was revised to reduce drug penalties). 
79 See Friedman, supra note 37, at 332-34 (recounting increases and decreases in age of consent for 
statutory rape in various states). 
80 See Bill Piper, et al., State of the States: Drug Policy Reforms 1996-2002, at 42 (Drug Policy Alliance 
pub. 2003) (listing state law changes on medical marijuana and other drug policies). 
81 See Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. __ (2005). 
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forfeiture or directing its proceeds to drug treatment.82 That public sentiment also 
supports moderate legislative reform of drug crimes, such as Colorado’s. 
The same political dynamics that purportedly drive overcriminalization also 
should explain laws that increase punishment severity.  Yet while legislatures have 
dramatically increased prison sentences in recent decades, there is a modest countertrend: 
they have also proven capable of reducing mandatory sentences and otherwise reforming 
punishment policy in the direction of leniency.83 More than half the states have reformed 
sentences in the direction of leniency in the last several years.  They did so by various 
means—often by eliminating mandatory minimums, increasing judicial discretion in 
sentencing, or replacing incarceration with treatment for some drug offenders.84 In 2004 
and 2005, the New York legislature passed successive statutes that reduced severe 
mandatory sentencing requirements required by the state’s 1973 “Rockefeller” drug laws.  
The first statute reduced mandatory punishment levels, and the reach of those 
punishments, for more serious drug offenders; it also increased early-release possibilities 
for some classes of previously sentenced offenders as well as future offenders and 
expanded drug treatment options that are prerequisites for sentence reductions.85 The 
second statute extended those reforms for less serious felony drug offenders.86 Those 
 
82 Piper et al., supra note 80, at 5, 9-10, 37-41 (noting 12 states reduced drug punishments in 2001-02 and 
10 states reformed asset forfeiture laws between 1996 and 2002). 
83 Rachel Barkow persuasively describes these trends as a function of budget constraints on state 
legislatures, for whom prison costs are a significant expense.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the 
Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1276, 1285-86 (2005) (discussing this trend of state sentencing 
reductions and citing sources); id. at 1286-1314 (arguing state budget constraints explain state sentencing 
reform and such cost considerations serve a deliberation-forcing function absent in federal debates). 
84 See Piper et al., supra note 80, at 4-5 & 39-40 (listing ten states that reduced sentences, mostly for drug 
crimes, in 2001 and 2002); Donna Lyons, State Crime Legislation in 2004 (National Conf. of State 
Legislatures 2005) (listing 16 states that have reduced drug sentences by increasing treatment options and 
eliminating mandatory minimums and increasing parole opportunities);  Donna Lyons, State Crime 
Legislation in 2003 (National Conf. of State Legislatures 2004) (listing similar sentence-reduction 
legislation several states including other states); Donna Lyons, State Crime Legislation in 2002 (National 
Conf. of State Legislatures 2003) (recounting similar reforms). For links to state legislation enacting 
reforms, see the National Conference of State Legislatures website at www.ncsl.org/public/leglinks/cfm.
85 See Ch. 738, N.Y. Laws (2004); see also Al O’Connor, A Summary of the Rockefeller Drug Law 
Reform Legislation, 21 Public Defense Backup Center Report 15-18 (Sept.-Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.nysda.org/hot_topics/rockefeller_drug_laws/rockefeller_drug_laws.html.
86 Ch.643, N.Y.Laws (2005); see also Al O’Connor, A Summary of the 2005 Rockefeller Drug Law 
Reform Legislation, 22 Public Defense Backup Center Report 13-15 (Aug.-Sept.. 2005), available at 
http://www.nysda.org/hot_topics/rockefeller_drug_laws/rockefeller_drug_laws.html
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reforms are not unique.  In 1998 Michigan reformed its mandatory life-without-parole 
statute for large-quantity drug dealers.87 
Legislatures have also limited the scope of the death penalty.  Between 1981 and 
2004, thirteen states enacted statutes that eliminated juvenile offenders from capital 
punishment eligibility (and Washington state did so by judicial decision).88 Between 
1986 and 2001, eighteen states enacted statutes removing mentally retarded offenders 
from death penalty eligibility; bills to do the same passed in one or both houses of other 
state legislatures but failed to become law.89 The Supreme Court cited these consistent 
legislative trends as evidence of a national consensus on capital punishment limitations 
that the Court used to support constitutional rules that barred juveniles and the mentally 
retarded from death eligibility.90 Despite increasing use of capital punishment in the last 
twenty years,91 these restrictions continued a tradition of restricting the scope of capital 
punishment eligibility.92 In the wake of Furman v. Georgia in the early 1970s, only three 
states that reinstituted the death penalty applied it beyond murder to rape.  Before 
Furman, that number had gradually declined, through legislative reform, to sixteen.93 All 
those changes are, in a real sense, modest shifts around the edges of death penalty 
 
87 Id. at 38 (Michigan House Bill  4065).  For description of such trends in Minnesota, see Richard S. Frase, 
Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 Crime & Justice: A Review of Research __ (2004) 
(noting “punitive trend” in Minnesota policy has slowed since 1993). 
88 See Victor Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, 
Jan. 11973 to Feb. 28, 2005, at 7 (listing states that have raised minimum age for death penalty since 1981); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Appendix A lists state statutes that raise minimum age for death 
penalty to 18).  These reductions in death eligibility occurred at a time when states frequently expanded 
punishment for juvenile criminals in other respects.  See H. Snyder & M. Sickmund, National Center for 
Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report 89, 133 (Sept. 1999). 
89 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 & nn.9-18 (2002) (listing states that removed mentally 
retarded offenders from capital punishment eligibility). 
90 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring execution of the mentally retarded); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring execution of offenders under age 18). 
91 A few jurisdictions such as New York and the federal system reinstated capital punishment in the last 
two decades for some murder offenses, and the rate of executions rose between 1981and 1999 after a long, 
steady decline.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2003 (Nov. 2004) NCJ 206627. 
92 The Anglo-American history of capital punishment is one of steady contraction of the crimes punishable 
by death.  England long had mandatory death penalty for all felonies (though with moderating mechanisms 
such as benefit of clergy).  See McLynn, supra note 36.  The United States initially had the death penalty 
for all forms of murder (and other serious felonies), until Pennsylvania in 1794 provided a model, copied 
widely, for separately defining only the worst murders as death eligible.  In 1838, Tennessee was the first to 
adopt a discretionary death penalty statute; 23 states followed by 1900 and all states by 1962.  See Louis J. 
Palmer Jr., Encyclopedia of Capital Punishment in the United States 425-26 (2001).  By 1970s, capital 
punishment was barred for all crimes but a subset of murder. 
93 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding capital punishment unconstitutional for rape 
offenses and citing the decline of states use of the death penalty for rape as one rationale). 
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administration.  But they are also examples of legislatures overcoming inertia to vote 
affirmatively to limit capital punishment in states where voters support the penalty. 
All of this suggests that, despite scholars’ worries, accretion of criminal statutes in 
recent decades does not mean we are moving closer to a the day that our state criminal 
codes makes everyone a felon; legislatures can make major as well as minor reforms that 
contract criminal law without public opposition.  The worry about the scope of criminal 
law touching widely in ordinary people’s lives was as legitimate—probably much more 
so—75 or 100 years ago, when vice, speech/expression, explicit media and lifestyle 
crimes (including bans on contraception and use of profanity) were at their peak.94 
Prohibition made criminals of many Americans, and recall that Prohibition continued 
locally in many areas long past 1933.  Hold aside colonial-era comparisons that come 
from a pre-constitutional culture, and hold aside as well Jim Crow laws that made 
criminals of African Americans in many parts of the country for innocuous conduct—and 
would have done so more often had those laws95 and the social practices supporting them 
been less effective in achieving high compliance.96 Criminal law has substantially 
contracted in all these realms of private, social and morals-related conduct, even as it 
expanded in other dimensions, such as regulatory crimes.  Criminal law today often 
punishes too harshly, but criminal law’s practical scope for most people—its regulation 
of most citizens’ lives (as opposed to its reach in white-collar and corporate contexts) is 
narrower than a century ago.  The problem of punishing conduct that is widely viewed as 
wholly innocent is fairly minimal in practice.  Because of criminal law’s multiple levels 
of democratic responsiveness, those instances are isolated rather than systemic, and they 
are not plausibly worse than a century ago. 
C.  International Comparisons 
 
94 See Boyer, supra note 48 (history of vice-societies that successfully pushed for legislation and 
enforcement banning obscene books and movies); Nelson, supra note 28, at 273 & nn.34, 37 (noting 
criminal prosecution of book sellers and of theaters for showing obscene movies); id. at 291-99 (describing 
movie/book censorship that gradually loosened by the 1960s); Friedman, supra note 37, at 350-54. 
95 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 37, at 85-97 (describing how “criminal provisions were a vital part” of the 
southern, post-Civil War “Black Codes” and included crimes for failing to work, for “enticing” a worker 
away from his job, and for quitting a  job while under contract to work). 
96 For a short overview of vigilante activity used especially to enforce racial social codes, see Friedman, 
supra note 37, at 179-92. 
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As a final reference point, note there is little evidence American criminal law is 
substantively broader than codes in other comparable democracies, though American 
incarceration rates are higher.  Comparative criminal scholarship focuses mostly on 
procedure and sentencing; what comparative scholarship exists on substantive law 
concentrates on “general part” issues rather than specific crime definitions.  Where 
scholars have addressed this question, however—especially regulation of expressive and 
offensive conduct—we see other Western democracies criminalize conduct that 
American jurisdictions do not.  Germany criminalizes not only offensive or provocative 
language but the expression of certain ideas, such as insults to religious denominations or 
minority groups, arguments against democratic government, and denial of the 
Holocaust.97 The last is also a crime in many democracies including Israel, Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands; France criminalizes public denial of crimes 
against humanity, including minimizing the number of concentration camp victims.98 
Most of those laws were enacted in the 1980s and 1990s to supplement existing criminal 
laws against racial discrimination.99 Canada also criminalizes (far more broadly than 
American hate-crimes offenses) core political speech when it contains expressions of 
racial hatred or bias that threaten equality, dignity and multiculturalism norms, and it is 
also more restrictive on pornography distribution.100 
Germany, like other European nations, also has expansive criminal law against 
“insult”—offenses that protect personal dignity and respect and that punish expressions 
such as “jerk,” use of the informal pronoun for “you,” and gesturing insultingly by giving 
“the finger” (regularly enforced with fines over $1,100).101 European nations also legally 
 
97 Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Comparative Legal 
Analysis of the Freedom of Speech 93-130 (2006) (describing German law restricting speech); Tatjana 
Hornle, Offensive Behavior and German Criminal Law, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 255 (2002) (describing 
German crimes of offensive conduct including expression of forbidden ideas or opinions). 
98 See Bert Swart, Denying Shoah, in Personal Autonomy, the Private Sphere and the Criminal Law: A 
Comparative Study 161, 166-67 & n.19 (Peter Alldridge & Chrisje Brants eds. 2001); James Q. Whitman, 
Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 Yale L.J. 1279, 1359 (2000). 
99 Swart, supra note 98, at 162-67. 
100 See Krotoszynski, supra note 97, at 52-92.  Among other cases, Krotoszynski discusses Zundel v. R., 3 
S.C.R. 731, 743 (1992), in which the majority noted that although Parliament is free “to criminalize the 
dissemination of racial slurs and hate propaganda,” those criminal statutes must be drafted so that they do 
not “stifle a broad range of legitimate and valuable speech.” 
101 Whitman, supra note 98, at 1296-1304.  Interestingly, German scholars, like their American 
counterparts, urge the contraction criminal codes so as not to criminalize such conduct, but without success.  
Id. at 1301-02. 
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protect privacy in ways American law does not; in France it is a crime to post nude 
pictures of another on the internet, and press publication of facts about another’s private 
life can be a contravention—a petty criminal offense.102 
Comparative literature is thinner on other substantive crime topics, but there are 
not indicia of notably narrower codes on other issues.  The general scope of drug 
prohibition doesn’t seem to be notably narrower in other western democracies; even the 
Netherlands, at the libertarian extreme with a code that long eschewed moralism as a 
basis for offense definitions, criminalizes drugs in its code but functionally 
decriminalizes through non-enforcement.103 (The same approach characterizes Dutch law 
on euthanasia.)104 Local enforcement patterns might show much divergence across 
jurisdictions, but coordinated international efforts on drug enforcement are one indicator 
of a widespread commitment to fight large-scale narcotics distribution with criminal 
law.105 The English criminalize theft of trade secrets, postal or telephone harassment, 
electronic surveillance, and disclosure of confidential information.106 Many European 
countries have expanded crimes and penalties for private pornography possession, 
especially for images of children.107 More comparative work might find other 
democracies have fewer trivial or redundant offenses or narrower offense definitions for 
fraud.  But from these glimpses, at least, there is little basis for a claim that American 
criminal law is overbroad compared to other western nations. 
D. Legislative inaction. 
Finally, consider the record of legislative inaction.  Failure is the norm for 
legislative proposals, because the legislative process is rife with vetogates108—procedural 
 
102 James Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity v. Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1178, 
1199 (2004). 
103 See Alldridge & Brandts, supra note 98, at 17. 
104 Constantijn Kelk, Consent in Dutch Criminal Law, in Alldridge & Brandts, supra note 98, at 206, 214-
19 (describing euthanasia policy and the Dutch tradition of a non-moralizing criminal code). 
105 See Drug Policy Alliance, Drug Policy Around the World, at 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/drugtraffick/. 
106 Peter Alldridge, The Public, the Private, and the Significance of Payments, in Alldridge & Brants, supra 
note 98, at 83 (citing statutes). 
107 See Kelk, supra note 104, at 211 (describing Dutch law). 
108 William Eskridge, Philip Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 68 
(2000); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Canons: The Role of 
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. LJ 705 (1992) (discussing concept of vetogates); 
see also Stuntz, supra note 1, at 549 & 554 (explaining why “many proposed criminal statutes do not 
pass”). 
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points at which bills can be blocked.  Many vetogates provide occasions to kill a proposal 
without legislators formally voting on the bill.  If criminal law has unusual advantages in 
overcoming these hurdles, it must somehow finesse the multiple opportunities legislators 
have to halt a bill’s progress through logrolling, creation of new coalitions and other 
strategic behavior that imperils typical legislation.109 This is the argument, often made 
implicitly, by overcriminalization scholars: coalitions for crime creation are easy to form 
and unusually stable, in part because the imbalance of interest group power, lopsided 
public sentiment, and political salience of crime bills help broaden and stabilize these 
coalitions.110 The commonly employed image is that the criminal law legislative process 
is a “one way ratchet” for increasing substantive law’s scope and sentencing severity.111 
There is some evidence for this, particularly in Congress.112 Nonetheless, 
examples abound of criminal law and sentencing bills failing even when they fit the 
paradigm of easy-to-pass proposals.113 Consider two examples from the first session of 
the 109th Congress.  The Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act, H.B. 3889, 
originally contained provisions to increase mandatory minimum sentences for 
methamphetamine possession offenses.  In November 2005, the House Judiciary 
Committee unanimously approved an amendment, sponsored by the committee’s 
Republican chairman, to eliminate those sentencing provisions from the bill.114 The 
 
109 See Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 108, at 68. 
110 See Luna, supra note 10; at 719; see also Barkow, supra note 33, at 727-35 (describing politics of 
sentencing policy); Stuntz, supra note 1. 
111 See Luna, supra note 10, at 719 (arguing “the escalation of ‘law and order’ politics has created a one-
way ratchet in U.S. governance, churning out an ever-increasing number of crimes and severity of 
punishment”); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 509 (asking “How did criminal law come to be a one-way ratchet 
that makes an ever larger slice of the population felons …?”); id. at 547; Beale, supra note 10, at 773 
(explaining factors that lead to a “one way ratchet toward the enactment of additional crimes and harsher 
penalties”); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained 
Punishment, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 293, 301 (2005) (“legislative adjustments to federal sentencing policy have 
been a one-way ratchet for twenty years”). 
112 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale 
L.J. 331 (1991) (finding that congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations that go 
against the government in criminal cases are more successful than attempts to overturn other statutory 
interpretations). 
113 Scholars occasionally cite failure of bills as examples of legislators’ tendency to overcriminalize.  See, 
e.g., Luna, supra note 10, at 705-06 & n.16 (citing H.R.834, 108th Cong. § 305 (2003) and H.R.2962, 108th 
Cong. § 2 (2003)) (both provisions proposed criminal liability for promoters of social events at which 
promoters should have known drugs would be used). 
114 See Famm.org. 
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Senate counterpart to this bill contains no provisions to increase mandatory sentences.115 
On the other hand, the House fairly quickly passed H.B. 1279, the Gang Prevention and 
Effective Deterrence Act, which created mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile 
offenders in gang-related crimes.  The Senate committee, however, failed to act on its 
counterpart bill, S. 155, in the first session.  That may be in part due to lobbying efforts 
by groups that opposed the sentencing provisions.  Those groups included not only the 
ABA, the Judicial Conference (familiar, if often weak, opponents of mandatory-
sentencing laws) and Families Against Mandatory Minimums, but also the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers and the American Federation of 
Independent Businesses.116 
As a random state example, Virginia’s legislature in 2005 let die in committee 
bills that would criminalize the creation of a secret compartment in a car to transport 
drugs, interference with a phone call with the intent to prevent a victim from summoning 
emergency assistance, assault of a state judge and use of fake discount coupons, as well 
as penalty increases for injuring animals or committing murder pursuant to gang 
orders.117 Since most bills fail, these examples prove little, except that bills for politically 
appealing offenses do not necessarily “sail through the legislature”118 much more readily 
than bills on other many other topics, and legislators can stop such proposals often 
without recorded votes against them. 
More systematic data is hard to generate.  No comprehensive empirical analysis 
exists on the success rate of criminal law bills in state legislatures or Congress (nor 
apparently on other policy topics).119 We nonetheless have some data that work as rough 
proxies and suggest criminal law proposals do not have distinctive success rates in 
 
115 Id. 
116 See http://famm.org/si_federal_sentencing_gangbill05.htm (copies of letters to Senate Committee 
opposing S.155 that are signed by these groups). 
117 See HB 170, HB 1502, HB 1618, HB 1748, HB 646, HB 1800 (2005 session) (histories available on the 
Virginia Legislative Information System, Bill Subject Index, under the Crimes and Offenses heading at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+sbj+SBJ). 
118 See Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1, at 634, though this claim is common in criminal law 
literature. 
119 The task would be formidable.  While all legislatures have legislation databases, most do not organize 
them by subject matter.  Most can be searched, but search terms (such as “crime,” “sentence,” “felony,” 
“misdemeanor,” etc.) don’t yield comprehensive lists of statutes creating, modifying or abolishing offenses.  
Further, one needs to sort bills that add crimes and penalties from those that reform offense definitions, 
decriminalize or cut punishments, and also sort bills that address substantially the same topic. 
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American legislatures.  We have solid data on the percentage of bills (on all topics) that 
become law in every legislature.  Passage rates vary greatly.  In Congress, only about five 
percent of bills become law.  The percentage climbs substantially for state legislatures, 
though with much variation: from 5.4 percent in Minnesota in a typical year and 15.2 in 
Illinois to nearly 40 percent in California and over 60 percent in Arkansas, North Dakota 
and Utah.120 
Further, a few states have databases that categorize both bills and enactments by 
subject matter.  Data from those sources are suggestive.  In Texas, for the 1997 general 
session, the overall percentage of bills that were enacted was 26.7 percent.121 Searching 
by four substantive criminal law categories,122 it turns out that only 19.75 percent of bills 
in those categories passed both houses.123 Figures in Utah are similar.  In the 1997 
legislative session, the overall success rate of bills was 58.9 percent.  For bills in the 
“criminal code” category,124 however, the passage rate was only 47.5 percent.125 And in 
Pennsylvania’s 1995-96 session only 7.38 percent of bills categorized under “crimes and 
offenses” were enacted; the overall passage rate of all bills in that body that year was 7.9 
percent.126 
To be sure, these data are only suggestive.  Criminal bills are not sorted by the 
substantive content and thus the data may include bills that both create or abolish crimes, 
that increase or decrease penalties, or that address the same issue; some bills may pass in 
a future session; a multi-topic bill may pass while single-topic bills fail.127 Legislators 
may gain credit for merely introducing bills that don’t pass, which still reflects an 
incentive toward criminalization.  But these measures are as suggestive as raw word- or 
 
120 See Peverill Squire & Keith E. Hamm, 101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures and the Future of 
Legislative Studies 117 tbl. 4-3 (2005). 
121 Id. at 117; 33 Book of the States at 109. 
122 I used four search categories in the Texas legislature’s database: crimes—drugs; crimes—against 
morals; crimes—against persons; crimes—against property. See 
www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/billsrch/criteria.htm.
123 Id; data for 1997 general session.  Data on gubernatorial vetoes is not readily available in the database. 
124 Criminal law bills were identified solely by the database’s category “criminal code.” 
125 Data for 1997 general session, searching under “criminal code—all legislation” and “criminal code—
passed bills” headings on the “bill search” database at http://www.le.state.ut.us/Documents/bills.htm. 
126 See 33 Book of the States 109 (using 1995-96 data for all bills and enactments); data on crime bills 
generated by searching under “crimes and offenses (18PaCS)” heading for 1995-96 session in the Bill 
Topic Index at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/bills/topindex.cfm?CiScope=/2005_0. 
127 Note that it is possible but unlikely that a large number of bills abolishing crimes or decreasing 
penalties were introduced and then rejected, thereby driving up the overall failure rate of bills in the 
category. 
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offense-counts to measure codes’ growth, which don’t discount redundant criminalization 
(though it does not increase criminal law’s scope) nor acknowledge legitimate new crime 
definitions (for, say, computer crimes, environmental crimes or terrorism).  And these 
data nonetheless raise a question about the assumption that bills adding offenses and 
penalties have a distinctly higher success rate in legislatures because members fear voting 
against such proposals.  This should not surprise: research on legislative process offers 
explanations both for the common failure of bills and for legislators’ ability to support 
bills that abolish offenses and reduce penalties. 
 
III. Theories of Legislative Process 
The record of legislative reform of criminal law raises suspicions about the 
dominant story of criminal law’s peculiarly easy path to enactment.  Something must 
explain legislators’ abilities to vote for an array of decriminalization and punishment-
reduction measures that should be effective fodder for campaign ads, and to vote 
against—or avoid voting on—bills that increase criminalization and punishments.  Part of 
the explanation, especially for many speech-related, alcohol, and consensual sex crimes, 
and perhaps some weapons offenses, lies in ordinary theories of legislatures’ 
responsiveness to social movements and broad shifts in majority preferences.  But much 
of this change is low-visibility legislative action (or inaction) not subject to powerful 
lobbies or much public attention or other monitoring.  Much of the explanation for these 
actions lies in legislation scholarship, a body of work undervalued by criminal law 
scholars and that, in turn, pays little direct attention to criminal justice issues. 
A. Organizational variations among state legislatures and Congress. 
Legislation research makes the overcriminalization story puzzling.  Most 
legislation fails because vetogates give interest groups, committees, legislative leaders, or 
larger coalitions means to block legislation, often without recorded votes by most (or 
any) legislators.  Peverill Squire and Keith Hamm’s recent survey of research on state 
legislatures documents that those bodies vary substantially in their organization compared 
to Congress and to each other, making generalizations from congressional research 
difficult.  The focus on congressional research is natural in the broad range of policy 
areas that federal policy dominates.  But states dominate crime and punishment policy, 
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and state legislatures vary greatly with regard to the very procedural rules and 
frameworks that legislation scholars (focusing on Congress) have found to affect 
legislative outcomes.  Those rule variations, which alter the number and nature of 
vetogates, are reflected the widely different passage rates for bills introduced in state 
assemblies. 
Congressional scholars have noted shifts in the power of parties, committees or 
their chairs, and chamber leadership over time as congressional rules and norms have 
changed.128 State legislatures show those same variations, but they hardly shift in unison 
or in accord with Congress.  As one example, scholars have measured the power of house 
speakers in Congress and state legislatures over time.  Congressional house speakers’ 
power has diminished over time: Speaker Cannon’s power far exceeded Speaker 
Hastert’s.  But speakers in the lower chamber of eleven states have powers that exceed 
even Cannon’s, and the vast majority have power that exceed Hastert’s.129 Powerful 
speakers can diminish or increase the effectiveness of many vetogates. 
Further, committee power in state legislatures has not been nearly as thoroughly 
studied as congressional committees, and those bodies show great variation along every 
parameter: the number of committees per chamber; the rate at which they favorably 
report bills referred to them (a measure of their effectiveness as vetogates) and the degree 
to which they otherwise play an important role in the legislative process; the specification 
of their jurisdiction; who appoints committee members; whether committee membership 
accords with proportional representation rules or otherwise reflects median or majority 
sentiments; and whether conference committees are used to resolve House and Senate 
differences and by what decision rules.130 Committee procedures and germaneness rules 
 
128 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 
100 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 708-10 (2000) (describing shifts in congressional power among committee chairs 
and from committee chairs to parties and arguing that budget procedures strengthen parties over committee 
chairs and explaining why individual members  give up in that framework); Burdett A. Loomis, The 
Contemporary Congress 87-88 (2d ed. 1998) (describing 1970s congressional reforms that decentralized 
power); Norman J. Ornstein et al., The Changing Senate: From the 1950s to the 1970s, in Congress 
Reconsidered 3 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1977) (describing decentralization of 
power in the Senate). 
129 See Squire & Hamm, supra note 120, at 102-03 & tbl. 4-1, relying on data from Richard A. Clucus, 
Principle-Agent Theory and the Power of State House Speakers, 26 Leg. Studies Q. 319 (2001). 
130 See Peverill & Squire, supra note 120, at 105-20.  State chambers vary as well in other procedural 
choices: who controls referral of bills to committee; on what issues they employ supermajority rules; 
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may explain how reforms come more easily in some contexts than others.  Colorado’s 
repeal of its loitering offenses, harassment statute and anonymous-political-ads crimes 
were bundled in a single bill that also increased punishment options for some juvenile 
felony offenders, expanded liability for contributing to delinquency of minors and raised 
some drug offense penalties while lowering others.131 
Scholars also measure state legislatures’ “professionalization” through indicia 
such as members’ pay, days in session, and amount of staff and other administrative 
resources.132 Chambers vary greatly on those parameters as well, which creates an 
uncertain variable.  There is some evidence that “legislators enjoy increasing electoral 
isolation from political tides as professionalization levels rise,” in part because “the 
relationship of interest groups and legislators is mediated by professionalization.”133 On 
the other hand, some scholarship suggests that states with more professionalized 
legislatures have greater congruence between public opinion and policy outcomes.134 
(Note that Congress is the most professionalized legislature, and scholars widely assume 
that it is excessively well attuned to political tides on crime issues.) 
All of these variations in legislative structure make untenable assumptions that 
theories explaining congressional behavior will map easily onto state legislatures or, 
more specifically, that theories of criminalization’s easy success in a particular legislative 
regime will have strong explanatory force across the range of American legislative 
bodies.135 Instead, this variation suggests some legislative models will be more effective 
than others at moderating or otherwise shaping legislation on criminal law as well as 
other topics.  Democratic outcomes are “a product of specific institutional structures and 
 
whether and how filibusters are used; and how readily discharge petitions can be employed to move bills 
from committees to the floor.  Id. at 116-26. 
131 See Colo. H.B. 97-1077 (effective July 1997). 
132 Id. at 79-97. 
133 Squire and Hamm, supra note 120, at 95, citing Michael D. Berkman, Legislative Professionalism and 
the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Group Density, 26 Leg. Studies Q. 661 
(2001); William D. Berry, Michael B. Berkman & Stuart Schneiderman, Legislative Professionalism and 
Incumbent Reelection: The Development of Institutional Boundaries, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 859 (2000). 
134 See Cherie Maestas, Professional Legislatures and Ambitious Politicians: Policy Responsiveness of 
State Institutions, 25 Leg. Studies Q. 663 (2000). 
135 While the federal government eliminated parole and adopted rigid sentencing guidelines, only a 
minority of states followed the federal model on those two policy changes.  See Menlove, supra note 24 
(listing the majority of states that still have parole); Barkow, supra note 33 (discussing state sentencing 
laws and comparing the federal sentencing commission with state counterparts). 
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legal rules” rather than unmediated manifestations of popular will.136 “The bills that are 
regularly enacted owe their existence to institutional structures and agenda control by 
party leaders as much as to majority rule.”137 The procedural and structural variations 
among state legislatures, then, should yield different outcomes even if popular sentiment 
on criminal law issues is consistent across jurisdictions.  At least some existing legislative 
structures should pose substantial roadblocks to any popular pressure for 
overcriminalization. 
B. Harnessing expertise and procedural frameworks for criminal law. 
While legislatures vary in their standard rules and organizational features, they 
sometimes adopt special rules on specific legislative topics.  Elizabeth Garrett has 
recently described models of “framework legislation” in Congress that structure decision-
making in particular policy areas to solve collective action problems, increase or decrease 
powers of committees or other players, or make certain substantive outcomes more likely 
by, for example, insulating staff or bill drafters from partisan pressure.138 Congress’s 
creation of the federal Sentencing Commission to overhaul sentencing policy is one 
version of this practice and was adopted with just these sorts of goals in mind.139 Other 
federal examples include the budget process,140 the Base Realignment and Closure Act 
(which assigns initial decision-making to an independent commission and limits 
Congress’s authority to change or reject the commission decisions), fast-track trade 
legislation (which structures Congress’s involvement on trade agreements negotiated by 
presidents), and a 1998 tax act that requires a “tax complexity analysis” on many tax 
bills.141 
136 Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
643, 644 (1998). 
137 Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1686 
(2002); see also Daniel Ortiz & Samuel Issacharoff, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 Va. L. Rev. 
1627 (1999) (describing the effects of political intermediaries, such as lobby groups and civic groups, on 
the problems of direct public monitoring of representatives). 
138 Elizabeth Garrett, Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues __ (2005). 
139 See Barkow, supra note 33, at 717-18 (describing legislator’s hopes that the commission will reduce the 
risk of Congress “politicizing the entire sentencing issue”); id. at 757 (noting the federal commission is 
“universally recognized to be an ineffectual agency that has done little to change the tough-on-crime 
politics of sentencing at the federal level”). 
140 See Garrett, supra note 128. 
141 Garrett, supra note 138, at 5-8 (describing these framework laws and other examples). 
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States’ uses of framework laws are vastly under-studied.  Interestingly, however, 
some states in recent years have devised special procedures for criminal law issues that fit 
this framework description.  Some states have established law reform or crime 
commissions to which they delegate tasks of assessing needs for criminal law reform, 
proposing legislation and analyzing legislators’ proposals.142 This is a model Congress 
has used on a range of topics—military base closings, social security reform, security 
reform after 9/11, and federal sentencing policy—but, tellingly, never for substantive 
criminal law to ameliorate legislative dysfunction.  Combined with Congress’s greater 
ability to reap publicity from symbolic legislative action, which makes it more 
tempting,143 that helps explain why expansion of the federal code is so much greater than 
state codes. 
Take two examples.  The Virginia legislature charged its state crime commission 
in 2001 with proposing revisions to the criminal code,144 and in 2004 the legislature 
accepted the commission’s first set of recommendations and repealed a dozen rarely-used 
criminal statutes.  Those offenses were the sort scholars often complain about—silly 
offenses such as unlawful use of words “Official Tourist Information” or bringing dogs 
onto the Capitol Square, and antiquated ones such as jumping off railroad cars.145 They 
also included the more serious theft, fraud and conversion offenses noted above.146 This 
reform legislation also fixed some of the sorts of drafting problems that criminal code 
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in North Carolina, 1980-2000, 29 Crime & Just. 39, 41 (2002); Kevin R. Reitz, The Status of Sentencing 
Guideline Reforms in the U.S., Overcrowded Times, Dec. 1999, at 11, 13. 
143 The latter point is from Stuntz, supra note 1, at 546. 
144 See Va. House Joint Resolution 687 (summarized and available on Virginia Legislative Information 
System at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/0/efb53246fcf5501a85256ea20046e98f?OpenDocument). 
145 In repealing this last provision, Va. Code § 19.2-161 (repealed 2004), Virginia partially responded to 
Stuntz’s complaint about an excessive number of outdated railroad crimes.  See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 556 
& nn.185-86 (2001) (noting Virginia’s code has “a substantial separate section … devoted to railroad 
crime”). 
146 See supra text at note __; Virginia State Crime Commission, The Reorganization and Restructuring of 
Title 18.2 (House Doc. 15, 2004), at 
http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/0/efb53246fcf5501a85256ea20046e98f?OpenDocument (abolishing 
crimes of conversion of military property, sale of goods of another and failure to pay over proceeds, and 
overvaluation of property for purposes of influencing lending institution). 
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experts such as Paul Robinson urge.147 The commission proposed, and the legislature 
adopted, a consistent definition of “mandatory minimum” sentence, which had formerly 
varied across provisions.  They moved non-crime statutes out of the criminal code, and 
adopted a comprehensive penalty structure for felony sentencing.148 
New Jersey’s Law Revision Commission also had some success in cleaning up 
some redundant or outdated crimes, conflicting sentencing ranges and poor organization 
in its code.  The legislature adopted its recommendations to revise awkward crime 
definitions; to repeal duplicative crimes on marijuana-growing, on persuading others to 
take drugs, and on a range of other provisions; and to decriminalize several offenses that 
are “regulatory in nature and can be adequately addresse[d] through civil remedies,” 
including trivial offenses such as selling ship tickets without indicating the ship’s country 
of origin.149 
Note these reforms succeeded even though these state commissions are fairly 
weak as framework laws.  The legislatures were not restricted to up-or-down votes on the 
commission reports but still adopted them in bulk.  To be sure, this is not proof that all 
legislatures are consistently effective at keeping codes coherent and up-to-date.  
Robinson has documented they do not,150 and variations in states’ legislative procedures, 
as well as the absence or ineffectiveness of such commissions in many states, would 
predict as much.151 But these examples demonstrate a mechanism and capacity for repeal 
and reform of criminal provisions that scholars criticize, despite the fact that those 
 
147 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 170-73 (describing “the code degradation problem”); Robinson 
et al., supra note 18. 
148 Virginia State Crime Commission, The Reorganization and Restructuring of Title 18.2 (House Doc. 15, 
2004), at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/0/efb53246fcf5501a85256ea20046e98f?OpenDocument.
Not every crime commission recommendation makes it swiftly through the legislature.  The 
legislature let a commission proposal die in committee the following year.  See HB 1053 (reorganizing 
sentencing provisions) (passed the House but left in Senate committee, see http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?051+sum+HB1053). 
149 N.J. Law Revision Com’n, Report and Recommendations Relating to the Compilation of Criminal Law 
(1995) (describing recommendations for repeal, amendment and code reorganization); recommendations 
enacted in L. 1999 c. 90 (see http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/index/alpha-page1.htm). 
150 See Robinson et al., supra note 18.  Nor have examples of legislatures creating new, frivolous crimes 
ceased.  One example, perhaps among many, is 72 Okla. Stat. § 6-1 (felony of impersonating a veteran by 
wearing a Congressional Medal of Honor and falsifying supporting documents). 
151 For an example of an ineffective commission, see Okla. Criminal Justice Resource Center, Summary of 
Criminal Justice Actions of the 2004 Oklahoma Legislature (27 bills enacted creating new felonies; all four 
bills introduced to repeal offenses or reduce punishments failed), on file at http://www.ocjrc.net/.  See also 
Barkow, supra note 33, at 771-94 (describing variations in state commissions’ effectiveness with 
legislatures on sentencing issues). 
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changes are hardly pressing issues on legislative or interest-group agendas nor triggered 
by high-profile news events.  Commissions help legislatures achieve reform that is less 
likely under regular rules and procedures.152 The ratchet of criminal legislation can turn 
both ways. 
 Variations on this model appear elsewhere.  Most states have now established 
commissions to study and make recommendations on their sentencing policies.153 Some 
have already succeeded in prompting sentencing reform such as that described above,154 
and a key tool they employ to prompt reform is financial impact analysis of sentence 
enhancements that show legislatures the likely cost of incarceration policies.155 Further, 
states periodically organize special bodies to review their codes and propose 
comprehensive reform, a process that sometimes provides the impetus for wide-ranging 
code reform.  Illinois and Kentucky both recently created commissions to study and offer 
reform strategies for their bloated codes (though neither has yet led to reform). 
In addition to framework laws, triggering events can prompt legislatures to act 
when they otherwise would not.  This is a familiar overcriminalization point: a publicized 
crime like a carjacking prompts (often unnecessary) legislation; many states added 
terrorism provisions in murder statutes and other parts of their criminal codes after 
9/11.156 But triggering events can also prompt criminal law repeal and reform; the best 
known example is promulgation of the Model Penal Code.  The MPC’s 1962 publication 
provided an occasion for several states to comprehensively revise their criminal codes.  
That wide-ranging reform, in addition to reducing redundancy and conceptual 
incoherence in many codes, included some decriminalization that states might not have 
pursued as readily if proposed as discrete repeal bills.  The MPC is credited with 
 
152 Cf. Garrett, supra note 138, at 32-33 (“Frameworks can be seen as precommitment devices enacted to 
constrain lawmakers and to make certain legislative outcomes more likely” or to “change the dynamics of 
bargaining” and “make certain actions more costly in political terms”). 
153 For a complete list of such commissions, see http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/p/cjl-info.php. For a 
discussion of several, see Robin Campbell, Dollars & Sentences: Legislators’ Views on Prisons, 
Punishment, and the Budget Crisis 15 (July 2003). 
154 See supra text at notes 83-93; see, e.g., Alabama Sentencing Commission Achieves Success: Sentencing 
Reform Legislation Enacted, at 
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/Publications/ASC%20Achieves%20Success%20NASC 
%20Article%207-03.doc.; Alabama Sentencing Commission, 2005 Annual Report. 
155 Barkow, supra note 33, at 800-10 (discussing state commission’s use of financial impact statements). 
156 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31(13) & 18.2-46.4 (defining murder during an act of terrorism as a 
capital offense and defining terrorism). 
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prompting decriminalization of sodomy and other consensual sexual conduct,157 for 
example, as well as petty offenses that the MPC categorizes as non-criminal 
“violations.”158 Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill advocate a Model Penal Code Second 
as the most promising means to prompt states again to comprehensively reform their 
criminal laws, arguing an MPC helps solve familiar bases for political resistance to 
reform by prosecutors, defenders, judges and legislators.159 Note that this pattern is 
familiar in other policy areas, which means also that legislative reluctance for 
comprehensive law reform is widespread across subject areas.160 
IV. The Breadth of Democratic Governance of Criminal Law 
A. Executive branch actors and democratic responsiveness. 
If a key measure of overcriminalization is whether its scope and effect accords 
with majoritarian preferences, laws-on-the-books do not tell the full story.  Democratic 
regulation of criminal justice does not end with legislatures.  The vast bulk of criminal 
law—state criminal law—is administered by prosecutors who are elected by local 
constituencies.161 (Federal prosecutors are appointed, and their accountability is more 
attenuated.)162 As Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz recently described, state prosecutors’ 
accountability combines with the salience of crime as a local political issue and 
constraints on enforcement budgets to give state prosecutors relatively little practical 
 
157 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (crediting the MPC with prompting decriminalization 
of consensual sexual conduct).  See also Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 173-77 (stressing MPC’s 
influence on state code reform in the 1960s and 1970s and arguing a second MPC could solve roadblocks 
to reform). 
158 See M.P.C. § 1.04 (“A violation does not constitute a crime”); cf. id. at § 2.12 (mandating dismissal for 
“de minimus” infractions of crimes). 
159 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 169-77. 
160 The MPC’s success at prompting state reform was modest compared to the states’ wider adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Forty-six states have adopted all or key 
parts of the U.C.C.  See http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html. Thirty-eight have substantially 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Uniform Rules of Evidence.  See 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/evidence.html.
161 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717, 734 
(1996) (95% of state prosecutors are locally elected) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts 2 (1993)). 
162 On federal prosecutors as political actors, see James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. 
Attorneys in the Political and Legal Systems (1978).  See also William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill 
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 861-63 (2001) (describing 
differences in political pressures and accountability between state and federal prosecutors). 
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discretion on a large portion of their dockets.163 Homicides, robbery, burglary, assault, 
auto-theft and some drug crimes are politically mandatory crimes for prosecutors and 
police to pursue—as are some lesser crimes, especially drunk driving and, often, 
domestic violence164—even if the odds of obtaining a conviction in any given case are 
fairly long.  That consumes most of police and prosecutors’ time and budgets.  State 
prosecutors depend on police to provide them with cases; police, busy with violent and 
other politically mandatory crimes as well as order-maintenance policing, have little time 
for silly, antiquated crimes.165 
Historically, patterns in discretionary enforcement vary.  Prosecutors mostly 
ignored crimes against homosexual sex, fornication or prostitution for decades, then 
dramatically stepped up enforcement in many locales for several years.  Sodomy 
prosecutions jumped in the early twentieth century before declining again.166 Liquor 
prosecutions in Virginia jumped in the 1920s to briefly become the most prosecuted 
felony.167 The federal Mann Act was aggressively used in the 1910s and 1920s to combat 
prostitution and even fornication but was nearly a dead letter by the 1960s;168 
prosecutorial campaigns against prostitution and red-light districts rose and declined with 
public sentiment and social-movement campaigns.169 Those variations do not refute the 
Richman-Stuntz thesis; they demonstrate instead that what crimes are politically 
mandatory (or at least politically appealing) to prosecutors vary as public opinion and 
interest group pressures shift. 
Note those constraints are not solely a product of prosecutors’ accountability.  
They are also a function of legislatures’ decisions to limit prosecutors’ budgets.  What 
legislatures give with one hand—expansive, redundant codes—they restrict with the 
 
163 Richman and Stuntz, supra note 10, at 599-606. 
164 Fla. Stat. § 741.2901 (mandatory prosecution policy). 
165 State prosecutors still have some discretion—witness local prosecutors’ recent creativity with drug 
courts and other dispositional alternatives.  John S. Goldkamp et al., Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
Community Prosecution Strategies: Measuring Impact 2-7 (Nov. 2002) (NCJ 192826) (listing programs 
employed by half of all prosecutors).  See also Bureau of Justice Assistance, Defining Drug Courts: The 
Key Components (Nov. 2004 NCJ 205621) (describing prosecutors’ nontraditional roles in drug courts). 
166 Friedman, supra note 37, at 344. 
167 Id. at 340. 
168 Id. at 325-28 & 343; see also Anne M. Coughlin, Of White Slaves and Domestic Hostages, 1 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev. 109 (1997) (comparing arguments that led to Mann Act and the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1998). 
169 Friedman, supra note 37, at 328-29. 
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other by limiting prosecutors’ resources, so that they cannot enforce every crime on the 
books.  Those limits have several effects; one is that they encourage plea bargaining over 
trials, which allows processing of more cases within a limited budget.  But budget limits 
also greatly constrain some effects of code growth, and this is likely legislatures’ intent.  
While tight budgets are a function of allocation decisions in light of resource constraints, 
restricting agency budgets is also a familiar legislative strategy to limit enforcement—an 
observation familiar to administrative law,170 where legislative opposition to enforcement 
policy is more common than in criminal law.  But legislators (and the public) express 
little such opposition to most criminal enforcement both because there is a large realm of 
universally accepted enforcement (traditional core crimes) and because resource 
constraints, plus accountability, are so effective at keeping prosecutors from doing much 
else. 
The combination of political accountability and budget constraints give state 
prosecutors a small practical range for pursuing prosecutions with little public support.171 
That is a key reason why overcriminalization scholarship pays a lot of attention to 
statutes on the books and much less to prosecutions under antiquated or trivial statutes.  
There is rarely a pattern of prosecutions under such statutes; we have only rare outliers, 
such as the sodomy prosecution of John Lawrence in Harris County, Texas.172 
Overcriminalization can happen on the books because it is so constrained in practice. 
 
170 Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien 
Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 191 (“Congress also has any number of formal and informal tools 
for placing political pressure on agencies to reverse unwanted actions” including “reduc[ing] agency 
budgets for enforcement.”); Paul B. Smyth, Milo C. Mason, Tough Choices Easier: Compliance and 
Enforcement, 18 SPG Natural Resources & Env't 3 (Spring, 2004) (similar point on EPA enforcement); 
Joe Sims, Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A 
Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 
865, 885 n.70 (1997) (noting Congress could “choose less aggressive or expansive enforcement by simply 
reducing agency budgets”). 
171 Those twin constraints are possible because prosecution is now monopolized by public prosecutors, and 
the maintenance of those constraints may explain why American jurisdictions are firm in resisting any 
efforts to return to even a limited role for private prosecutors.  See, e.g, State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.2d 309 
(Tenn. 2000) (dismissing indictments because public prosecutor allowed a private attorney, paid by a 
private group, to act as a special prosecutor and initiate charges with little public supervision). 
172 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The prosecution in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), was equally unusual, even in a state with strict anti-contraception laws.  See Comment, supra note 
50 (describing pre-Griswold history of prosecutions under anti-contraception statutes).  For another 
discussion of an adultery prosecution that seems to be an unusual outlier, see Joanna Grossman, Punishing 
Adultery in Virginia, Dec. 16, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20031216.html (discussing 
a 2003 Virginia adultery prosecution). 
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Democratic accountability also explains the occasional small, local pattern of 
enforcing obscure or controversial statutes.  In the 1990s an Idaho prosecutor won 
convictions of several pregnant teenage girls and their boyfriends for fornication; 
punishments were community service and parenting classes.173 The prosecutions (which 
didn’t continue long) were a strategy to deter teenage pregnancy and related social 
problems;174 most were prosecuted only after applying for public assistance.  The 
prosecutions drew criticism in national media, but it is likely the local electorate was not 
strongly opposed; the prosecutor won re-election a few months after securing the 
convictions.  The example supports the broader point.  Because state criminal law 
enforcement is accountable to local constituencies, prosecutions under seemingly 
outdated statutes may accord with local majoritarian preferences, and those preferences 
may be based on a policy rationale beyond simply moral opposition to fornication.  Even 
outlier prosecutions, then, might not be properly characterized as examples of over-
criminalization.  American criminal law is fragmented among 50 states, which fragment 
enforcement among localities.  We should expect the sort of policy variation and 
experimentation that characterizes (and is a virtue of) federalism.175 
Federal practice is different and worse.  Even there, scholars concede that much-
maligned statutes on carjacking or Smokey Bear’s image are rarely or never enforced.176 
But federal prosecutors have much more practical discretion arising from bigger budgets, 
 
173 See Heidi Meinzer, Idaho’s Throwback to Elizabethan England: Criminalizing a Civil Proceeding, 34 
Fam. L.Q. 165, 165 (2000) (describing the prosecutions); Scott Morris, Idaho Prosecutor: Old Law, New 
Plan to Curb Teen Pregnancy, World Mag., Nov. 11, 1996 (noting parenting classes as part of sentence), 
available at http://www.ageofconsent.com/idaho.htm 
174 See Morris, supra note 173 (quoting prosecutor’s explanation that the prosecutions address the area’s 
high teenage pregnancy rate and the risk that children of single teen mothers are more likely to go to jail 
later in life).  A few months after these prosecutions, prosecutor Douglas Varie was reelected (running 
unopposed) in Nov. 1996.  See Idaho Sec. of State, Election Division, at 
http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/96cntyrc.htm (Gem County election results 1996).  Apparently he did 
not run for reelection in 2000.  See Idaho Sec. of State, Election Division, at 
http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ELECT/2000rslt/general/county_2.htm (same for 2000). 
175 Cf. Herbert Weschsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 
Colum. L. Rev. 1425, 1427 (1968) (explaining the MPC drafters did not seek national uniformity because 
“substantive difference in social situation or point of view among the states should be reflected in 
substantial variation in their penal laws”). 
176 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 545-466 (discussing Congress’s tendency to enact symbolic crimes that 
“generate very few federal prosecutions”). 
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less democratic monitoring, and the power they gain from a rigid sentencing regime.177 
That discretion is most problematic when it combines with one specific sort of statutory 
breadth—expansive fraud and regulatory offenses that define undisputed wrongdoing but 
which also capture some marginal or innocuous conduct.178 The problem is worst where 
prosecutorial discretion is greatest—the small, unique but prominent (and now formally 
defunct) practice of independent counsels, who rigorously pursue marginal wrongdoing 
under broad false-statements statutes or the like.179 More common arguable abuses also 
arise under broad fraud and regulatory statutes,180 and federal offenses that duplicate state 
crimes, such as drug or weapons offenses, can result in disparate sentencing for criminal 
conduct.181 Those problems are real and worthy of scholarly and political attention, but 
bear in mind their exceptionalism.  Much overfederalization is contained within widely 
supported offenses (drug trafficking or gun use during crimes)182 rather than marginal 
ones, even though the sentencing disparities are troubling.  And problematic fraud and 
regulatory prosecutions make up a small fraction of federal practice,183 which itself 
 
177 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 555-65 (fraud examples); Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1-2 (criticizing 
conviction for negligent discharge of pollutant in United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999).  
For a counter-argument that prosecutions like Hanousek are appropriate, see Steve Solow & Ronald 
Sarachan, Criminal Negligence Prosecutions Under the Clean Water Act: A Statistical Analysis and an 
Evaluation of the Impact of Hanousek and Hong, 32 Env. L. Rptr. 11153, 11157-59 (Oct. 2002). 
178 See Coffee, Tort/Crime, supra note 17; Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 17; Rosenzweig, supra note 
3. 
179 See Stuntz, supra note 162, 861-65 (2001); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 590-91; Jeffrey Rosen, 
Overcharged: An Indefensible Indictment, The New Republic (Nov. 4, 2005) (noting the rarity of 
prosecutions solely for unsworn false statements and criticizing federal special prosecutors for 
inappropriately pursuing such charges) 
180 There is not uniform scholarly agreement that much-criticized federal prosecutions are unmerited or 
common.  See Kathleen F. Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Crime Prosecutions, 62 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1077 (2001) (defending environmental crime prosecutions); Solow & Sarachan, supra note 177. 
181 This is the complaint behind United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).  It is also the explicit 
rationale for Operation Exile, which diverted offenders of state weapons crimes to federal court for harsher 
punishment.  See Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement 
Authority, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (2001). 
182 Thirty-six percent of federal cases in 2001 included a charge for drug trafficking, and 85% included 
violent crime charges, and 7.5% included weapons charges.  (About 94% of drug cases were for trafficking 
rather than possession.)  See 2003 Sourcebook, supra note 4, at tbl. 5.17. 
183 About 11.7% of all federal criminal cases in 2001 were fraud cases (9,028 of 77,145), and presumably 
most of those were not controversial cases of marginal, ambiguous or innocuous conduct.  All “regulatory 
offenses” accounted for 1.5% of federal criminal cases in 2001 (1,166 of 77,145).  See 2003 Sourcebook, 
supra note 4, at tbl. 5.17.  And white-collar crime is the one area scholars have suggested may be under-
criminalized.  See Beale, supra note 10, at 780 (explaining why overcriminalization is less likely in white-
collar contexts and why we may have “too little white collar crime enforcement”); Richard Lazarus, 
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407, 2454 n.218, 2511 & n.448 (1995) (calling 
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constitutes perhaps five percent of American criminal law.184 Those problems are hardly 
representative of the general scope or effects of overcriminalization. 
Enforcement patterns arising from democratically accountable state prosecutors 
explain a final point as well.  Because most obscure or superfluous statutes in criminal 
codes are effectively nullified by prosecutors, legislatures’ incentives to update codes and 
repeal antiquated statutes are greatly reduced.  If American jurisdictions had mandatory 
prosecution policies, coupled with investigatory resources to pursue most violations, 
legislatures would likely repeal crimes much more quickly that no longer accord with 
majoritarian preferences.  (One suspects it wouldn’t take many prosecutions of Girl Scout 
troops for misusing Smokey Bear’s image to move Congress to repeal that crime.)  But 
legislators have little incentive to, because police and prosecutors, taking signals from 
local electorates, largely do it for them, and legislatures make sure they do by 
constraining enforcement budgets.  To be sure, effective repeal by non-enforcement is not 
the same as actual repeal.  Outdated, poorly conceived, and duplicative statutes, as noted, 
can generate doctrinal confusion on mens rea requirements, allow disparate treatment of 
similar offenders, and facilitate occasional vindictive prosecutions as well as muddy 
criminal law’s expressive and moral force.  But the democratic responsiveness of 
executive-branch officials nonetheless explains why legislatures are not more vigilant 
about keeping criminal codes in accord with popular sentiments.185 They achieve much 
of that goal indirectly through prosecutors’ budgets and accountability, rather than 
directly by repeal or careful code drafting.  Some are explicit about this delegation of 
code maintenance to the executive branch.  A Washington state statute urges prosecutors 
not to enforce “antiquated statutes” that “serve[] no deterrent or protective purpose in 
today’s society” and have “not been recently reconsidered by the legislature.”186 
B. Courts and democratic responsiveness. 
 
occupational health and safety law under-criminalized and arguing for reform of environmental criminal 
law rather than “the extreme result of noncriminalization”). 
184 See supra note __. 
185 In the federal context, Dan Richman has described additional tools Congress uses to influence 
enforcement, including use of oversight committees, constraints on investigative agencies’ jurisdictions and 
budgets, funding prosecutor jobs for specific agendas, and requiring Main Justice approval for some 
prosecutions.  See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement 
Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 757, 791-805 (1999). 
186Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.411(1). 
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As noted above, many of the Supreme Court decisions that constitutionally barred 
crimes or punishments occurred in the wake of state legislative trends repealing such 
laws.  State supreme courts similarly overturned criminal prohibitions and often 
prompted no legislative or popular backlash to reinstate those crimes.  Both of those 
patterns accord with an increasingly prominent thesis about American courts and 
majoritarian preferences.  Rather than being counter-majoritarian institutions, American 
courts rarely get far ahead of public opinion on controversial issues.  Michael Klarman’s 
landmark book From Jim Crow to Civil Rights makes this argument in what had 
previously seemed the unlikely context of the constitutional law of race relations.187 The 
same thesis may explain Lawrence v. Texas: the Court’s ban on sodomy crimes followed 
rather than led popular opinion.188 William Nelson offered a similar thesis to explain 
New York state courts’ changing interpretation of several morals-related criminal statutes 
through middle decades of the twentieth century.189 Nelson described New York courts 
as strictly enforcing criminal morals offenses, such as obscenity restrictions on media, in 
accord with popular support for such enforcement in the early part of that century.  As 
public opinion shifted, Nelson detailed shifts in courts’ interpretation of statutes not only 
of obscenity offenses and other crimes implicating free speech but even domestic 
violence and non-stranger rape crimes, which he characterized as functionally 
decriminalized by a range interpretative choices that made those offenses difficult to 
enforce.  Similarly, even the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions may be 
understood as more majoritarian than traditionally thought.190 
187 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for 
Racial Equality (2004); see also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Revolutions," 82 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights 
Movement," 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994).  For a comparable argument that the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause decisions correspond with popular sentiments and views of dominant political coalitions, see John 
C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279 
(2001). 
188 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 Mich. L. Rev. 431 (2005) (making 
this argument and describing changes in social views on homosexuality between Bowers v. Hardwick 
(1986) and Lawrence (2003)). 
189 See Nelson, supra note 28. 
190 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?  Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in 
the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361, 1365 (2004) (describing landmark criminal 
procedure cases as revealing “the Supreme Court’s lack of inclination for countermajoritarian decision 
making”). 
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Viewed this way, we can understand other trends in courts’ doctrinal construction 
of crime and punishment rules as adjustments that track shifts in popular sentiment.  
Consider two federal examples.  Federal judges had notoriously little discretion under 
sentencing guidelines before United States v. Booker.191 But even here, scholars found 
patterns of courts using their modest interpretive tools within the guidelines to temper 
excessive sentences.192 And in the context of federal regulatory or white-collar crime 
prosecutions, federal courts have a clear pattern of interpreting hundreds of criminal 
statutes to contain strict mens rea requirements.  Those constructions make prosecutions 
more difficult by giving defendants an ignorance-of-the-law defense.193 Many of the 
statutes courts have restricted in this way are the type of expansive provisions on obscure 
or marginal fraud conduct that a common focus of overcriminalization complaints:194 
statutes that criminalize un-sworn false statements,195 health and safety violations,196 
misapplication of student loan funds,197 unauthorized use of food coupons198 or recorded 
 
191 543 U.S. __ (2005) (holding portions of the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional and making 
those guidelines merely advisory for judges). 
192 See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining 
Federal Drug Sentences, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1043 (2001). 
193 See Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 
48 Duke L.J. 341 (1998).  Davis catalogs at least 160 statutes in which federal courts have interpreted the 
mens rea term “willful” to require proof that defendant knew his conduct was unlawful. 
194 See Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 17; Coffee, Tort/Crime, supra note 17; Rosen, supra note 179 
(noting the rarity of prosecutions solely for unsworn false statements and criticizing federal special 
prosecutors for inappropriately pursuing such charges). 
195 See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring knowledge that conduct was 
unlawful to support a conviction for causing campaign treasurers to submit false reports to the Federal 
Election Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)); United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court properly precluded a good-faith defense in instructing the jury on 
the willfulness element of a conviction for making false statements to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994)). 
196 See United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding determination by 
magistrate judge that criminal violation of workplace safety regulations under Occupational Safety and 
Health Act § 17(e), 29 U.S.C. §666(e) (1994), requires proof the defendant had "basic legal information"); 
McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co., 869 F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a violation of OSHA "is 
not willful when it is based on a nonfrivolous interpretation of OSHA's regulations"). 
197 See United States v. Bates, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (construing 20 U.S.C. §1097(a) (1994), 
which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully misapply federally insured student loan funds, to require 
proof that an accused exercised unauthorized control over such funds with knowledge that such an exercise 
was a violation of the law), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 285, 291 & n.7 (1997) (noting, however, that the question of 
whether a defendant had to have knowledge of illegality was not before the Court). 
198 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (holding that a person accused of knowing 
possession of food stamps in manner unauthorized by 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982) must be shown to have 
known the possession was unlawful); United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(same). 
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phone conversations,199 and the like.  One way to view these interpretive trends by courts 
is an effort to reign in excessive federal criminalization, and to decrease the odds that 
such statutes will be used to convict defendants whose conduct would widely be viewed 
as innocent or insufficiently wrongful to merit criminal punishment. 
On this account, courts serve as a third mechanism to moderate criminal law in 
accord with changing social views on appropriate criminalization.  That is especially 
important to explain the one area of substantial decriminalization that legislatures did not 
lead: crimes that implicated First Amendment liberties.  Crimes that limit free expression 
values, from radical political advocacy and civil rights protests to pornography and 
artistic or personal expression, are notable categories of activity that were substantially 
decriminalized in the twentieth century more by courts than legislatures.  Yet three 
observations suggest that the Supreme Court was not decriminalizing speech-related 
conduct in the face of strong public opposition. 
First, there are few indicia that the Court is notably more in conflict with 
majoritarian preferences and dominant political opinion on First Amendment topics than 
it has been on racial equality issues or elsewhere.  The Court has been notably solicitous, 
for instance, of legislative and executive actions that restrict speech in times of perceived 
crisis, such as the Red scares of the early 1920s and 1950s.200 Second, recent scholarship 
on the intellectual history of free speech has described the influence of social movements 
(such the Free Speech League founded around 1900) and elite opinion that urged 
deregulation of both obscenity and political speech and presaged doctrinal changes 
toward those ends.201 Court decisions barring crimes of speech-related conduct generated 
 
199 See United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that knowledge of the 
illegality of the wire interception is an element of the offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d) (1988)). 
200 See Martin H. Redish, The Logic of Persecution (2005); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective 
and the First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449 (1985).  For examples of Court decisions upholding 
convictions under state and federal statutes that criminalize political speech, see, e.g., Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (upholding convictions under Smith Act for conspiring to overthrow 
government by organizing Communist Party); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (affirming New 
York state’s criminal speech statute); In re Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (affirming Eugene Debs’ conviction 
under the federal Espionage Act for a political speech praising socialism and criticizing World War I); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming Espionage Act conviction for speech against the 
draft); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (affirming Espionage Act conviction); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1950) (affirming Sedition Act conviction). 
201 See David Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in 
American History, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 47 (1992); David Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 
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little of the sustained social-movement opposition sparked by decisions on abortion, 
school prayer, or even some criminal procedure rulings.202 Finally, popular culture seems 
to have largely endorsed many of the speech-related liberties courts evolved in the last 
several decades.  Risqué clothing, books, periodicals, music, movies, advertising and 
other media once banned by obscenity laws meet with considerable success in the 
marketplace and provide cultural support for the dramatic contraction of obscenity 
regulation.203 
Some components of First Amendment liberties likely remain counter-
majoritarian—decriminalization of flag burning and perhaps of some radical political 
speech are examples.  Also, given constitutional leeway, we would probably see some 
local political communities regulating in all these areas despite a national consensus in 
favor of decriminalization.  Nonetheless, in the largest area in which courts are 
responsible for decriminalization without legislative leadership, it is still plausible to 
view this form of decriminalization as an example of courts working within the rough 
parameters of democratic preferences.  Like prosecutorial decisions not to enforce 
statutes, courts that overturn or narrowly interpret criminal laws take pressure off of 
legislatures for decriminalization by doing some of the work for them.  Courts’ 
contributions, like those of state prosecutors, seem to do more to keep criminal law’s 
substantive reach in rough accord with majoritarian preferences than to depart from those 
preferences. 
C. The democratic baseline for judging overcriminalization. 
 The foregoing account responds partially to overcriminalization critiques that 
imply criminal law’s growth—and criminal justice’s problems—stem in large part from 
the one-way ratchet of legislatures expanding but rarely contracting crimes and 
punishment. It addresses as well the less explicit argument that legislatures distort 
 
74 Tex. L. Rev. 951 (1997); Mark Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil 
Libertarianism (1991). 
202 On the social history of the abortion debate and reaction to Roe v. Wade, see, e.g., Bearing Right: How 
the Right Won the Abortion Wars (2003); Abortion Wars: A Half Century of Struggle 1950-2000 (Rickie 
Solinger ed. 1998). 
203 See Friedman, supra note 37, at 350-54 (describing twentieth century weakening of obscenity regulation 
and attributing it to popular culture changes); Felice Flanery Lewis, Literature, Obscenity and the Law 225-
47 (1976) (describing trend toward greater legal protection and social acceptance of explicit or obscene 
materials). 
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majoritarian preferences through construction of criminal law.204 But this does not 
answer some overcriminalization criticisms, because many rest on normative claims 
about the appropriate scope and use of criminal law.  Statutes over-criminalize only 
relative some baseline of appropriate criminalization.  Many scholars are clear about 
normative-baseline claims.205 Erik Luna argues explicitly for a libertarian theory of 
criminal law, which would constrain many extant components of contemporary criminal 
codes.206 A similar perspective underlies recent overcriminalization reports sponsored by 
the Federalist Society, the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation.  David A.J. 
Richards grounds his human rights critique in an extension of deontological moral theory 
that gives priority to autonomy and equal rights for all persons.207 More fundamentally, 
the dominant popular and scholarly account of criminal law’s proper scope probably is 
the harm principle, a thesis that traces its origins from John Stuart Mill’s essay “On 
Liberty”208 through H.L.A. Hart’s defense of the principle (most prominently against the 
legal moralism thesis of Lord Devlin)209 to its adoption by Joel Feinberg,210 Herbert 
Packer,211 and others.212 The Hart-Devlin debate was a debate about the proper basis and 
 
204 This argument is implicit in complaints that legislatures enact silly, trivial or overexpansive statute that 
criminalize conduct few believe is blameworthy, and that they leave on the books offenses that majorities 
no longer support. 
205 Luna, supra note 10 (libertarian baseline); Packer, supra note 21 (urging no regulation of petty offenses 
better handled by civil regulation); Kadish, supra note 3; Kadish, supra note 21 (opposing morals and 
economic offenses); Rosensweig, supra note 3. 
206 See Luna, supra note 10, at 729-46. 
207 See Richards, supra note 3, at 1-20.  For another example, see Husak, Crimes, supra note 1 (sketching 
preliminary thoughts on a limiting theory for substantive crimes built on George Fletcher’s work). 
208 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859).   
209 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963); Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in The 
Enforcement of Morals 1 (1965).  The Hart-Devlin debate was recognized as a reiteration of the debate 
between Mill and Lord James Fitzjames Stephen a century earlier.  See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, Morals 
Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 670 n.1 (1963) (citing the Mill-Stephen 
debate  and noting “[t]he recent controversy traverses much the same ground as was surveyed in the 
nineteenth century.”).  For Lord Stephen’s position, see James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity (R.J. White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873). 
210 See Feinberg, Moral Enforcement and the Harm Principle (from Social Philosophy (1973)), reprinted in 
Ethics and Public Policy 291 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., 1975). 
211 See Packer, supra note 21, at 249-95. 
212 For a great account of the history of the harm principle and its advocates’ long battle against legal 
moralism, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109 
(1999).  By “collapse” Harcourt refers to the principle’s ubiquitous adoption in criminal law discourse, so 
that the principle no longer does much work of constraining criminal law when advocates can find every 
sort of action causes some diffuse, indirect, social harm. 
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scope of criminal law and therefore, at bottom, about the criteria by which 
overcriminalization claims should be judged.213 
Many of these arguments are (to me) persuasive.  American jurisdictions 
overcriminalize or overpunish when judged against a range of normative claims grounded 
in retributive justice, optimal deterrence or effective crime prevention.214 But these are 
arguments about what principles legislatures (and courts) should choose to adopt215 and, 
ultimately, what principles democratic majorities should be persuaded by and urge upon 
their representatives.  Many of those arguments, however sound, have not yet prevailed in 
political debates or the marketplace of ideas beyond academia. 
 Judged instead by how well it tracks majoritarian preferences, criminal law looks 
much less like over-criminalization, and legislative processes look less anomalous in their 
construction of criminal law.  High American incarceration rates reflect a broad cultural 
and political consensus for harsh criminal law that legislatures reflect fairly accurately, a 
claim at the core of James Whitman’s and David Garland’s recent, excellent (and 
divergent) books comparing American and European punishment policies.216 It is 
probably an insurmountable task to aggregate public preferences accurately on a broad 
topic like criminal justice and then assess how well political outcomes reflect those 
preferences.217 But there is little evidence that American legislatures, prosecutors and 
courts depart substantially and consistently—as opposed to occasionally in specific 
cases—from those preferences, nor that they do more so with regard to criminal law than 
other broad social policy topics. 
 
213 European scholars have the same complaints of their own codes.  See Whitman, supra note 98, at 1301-
1303. 
214 I have joined some of these arguments.  See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law,
92 Calif. L. Rev. 323 (2004); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of 
Criminal Liability,149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 (2001). 
215 Some are quite explicit on this point.  Packer directs his argument at what point to what the “rational 
legislator” should and should not vote for.  See Packer, supra note 21, at 272.  See also Luna, supra note 10, 
at 742 (“The idea would be for government officials to begin their consideration of a particular action—
such as a proposed law or an occasion for enforcement—from the perspective of libertarianism.”). 
216 For distinct arguments explaining contemporary American commitment to harsh punishment, see J. 
Whitman, supra note 6; D. Garland, supra note 6.  For data suggesting that prison incarceration rose only as 
mental hospital confinement declined, see Harcourt, supra note 20, at 2-4, 15-28. 
217 It may be a conceptually impossible one if no clear preferences are discernable outside the processes 
used to determine them.  See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 137, at 1686 (discussing Condorcet paradox, 
which “casts doubt on the premise that a simple majority can in normal circumstances even be identified”). 
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 That, in turn, helps explain consistent public support for criminal law.  Majorities 
are not always reliable protectors of minorities’ interests, and thus we have no political 
solution in sight, for instance, on excessive incarceration of African American men 
(though note modest progress on racial profiling).218 But if criminal law frequently 
reached conduct that majorities care about, public support for criminal law would shift 
quickly.  Imagine a world with regular prosecutions for sex or cohabitation between 
unmarried people, for Sunday retail sales, for wearing bikinis in public or possessing racy 
novels, for criticizing public officials on cable news channels, for defaulting on debt or 
refusing employment—all things we once criminalized, or nearly so, and that are still 
sometimes punished in other (mostly non-democratic) nations.  Even present-day cases of 
marginal federal fraud and false statement offenses would generate opposition if 
widespread enough to draw public attention (as independent counsel Ken Starr learned).  
Deviations from broad public preferences are agency costs; principals can’t monitor and 
control every detail of agents’ actions.  But the broad sweep of criminal law aligns, and 
adjusts over time, roughly with public preferences.  It just happens that, to the dismay of 
many (including me), those preferences support exceedingly harsh sanctions for many 
crimes and use of criminal law for social problems on which other policy tools could be 
effective. 
D. The coherence of democratic preferences on criminal law. 
 Even if American law is not overcriminalized by a plausible measure of 
democratic preferences, scholars criticize codes not only for failing to embody a 
particular normative vision, but for manifesting incoherence or irrationality by, for 
instance, criminalizing innocuous conduct, excessively punishing conduct that creates 
attenuated risks of harm, or punishing similar conduct (e.g., possession of crack and 
powder cocaine), or even the same conduct, differently under various statutes. 
Many of these criticisms track those made against regulation more generally.  
Agencies value human lives very differently in different contexts, and precautions against 
risk reduction don’t consistently match objective estimates of the likelihood of risks.219 
218 See Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/  
(noting more than twenty states have passed legislation prohibiting racial profiling or requiring data 
collection on racial profiling). 
219 See, e.g, Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
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These regulatory defects reflect much-discussed defects in human cognition: people 
exaggerate vivid, easily understood or recently publicized risks, for instance.  But those 
regulatory criticisms are themselves highly contested, and recent work reassessing 
regulatory critiques suggests a means also to challenge at least portions of the depictions 
of criminal codes as incoherent and irrational. 
Consider how emerging research on “cultural cognition” and its role in 
democratic decision-making might generate a more defensible description of recent 
trends in criminal code coverage.  Dan Kahan, Paul Slovic and their colleagues have 
developed accounts of “cultural worldviews” that categorize people’s perspective along 
axes of individualism-solidarism and hierarchy-egalitarianism.  Briefly, “hierarchists 
morally disapprove of behavior that defies conventional norms and thus naturally believe 
that deviant behavior is dangerous; egalitarians morally disapprove of norms that rigidly 
stratify people, and individualists disapprove of norms that constrain individual choice 
generally, so these types naturally believe that deviant behavior is benign” but favor 
markets and private orderings.220 These worldview descriptors help explain conflicting 
perspectives on risks and social policies addressing risks.  Worldviews affect how people 
assess risks, and even what evidence of risks they are willing to credit.  Perceptions of 
activities’ costs and benefits are filtered through cultural perceptions of the activities’ 
social meaning and moral import.221 Risk perceptions express, because they are 
dependent upon, cultural worldviews. 
 With these tools, we can see a path toward an account of some of criminal law’s 
contentious components as well as recent trends of its expansion and contraction.  For 
consensual sex crimes, individualist and egalitarian norms are now trumping formerly 
dominant hierarchical ones; the latter see greater risks in promiscuous sex.222 That is an 
emerging (much more modest) trend on nonviolent drug possession crimes as well, but 
hierarchists, who worry more about the harms of individual drug use, are still a dominant 
 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic 
Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998). 
220 Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 
__ (forthcoming 2006) (at ms. p22; see also 17); see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More 
Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1291, 1297-
98 (2003) (similar descriptive overview). 
221 Kahan et al., supra note 220, at 22-23. 
222 Id. at 22. 
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force in drug policy.223 Kahan and his colleagues have studied gun policy and find 
egalitarian and solidaristic people disfavor widespread private gun ownership on the view 
that it harms public safety; hierarchists and individualists fear gun restrictions because 
limiting private tools of defense diminishes public safety.  In these ways, cultural views 
affect how likely we perceive risks from such policy choices to be, and they these policy 
views in turn express specific, cultural visions of the good society and the virtuous life.224 
This cultural-evaluator approach provides a means for Kahan and his colleagues 
to respond to critiques that describe public preferences on regulatory issues as irrational 
by explaining the coherence of policy choices that depart from those implied by actuarial 
or other expert analysis of risk.  These tools likewise suggest ways to respond to some 
criticisms of criminal codes as irrational.  
I will not attempt here a full-scale theory of criminal codes’ coherence in light of 
recent patterns of offense expansion and repeal, but note some possibilities for that 
project.  The expansive federal law on fraud and false statements may be appealing to 
hierarchists, who may view even modest examples of such conduct as deviant challenges 
to legitimate institutional arrangements, while individualists may not view such conduct 
as benign acts entitled to freedom from sanction.  Change in alcohol policies might be 
coherent in these terms as well. As we liberalize alcohol access and as driving increases, 
we aim to reduce increasing risks from deviant misuses of these activities by harshly 
punishing drunk driving and restricting teen drinking.225 Widespread trends of 
decriminalizing consensual sex and gun possession likewise suggest a rise of 
individualist values.  But jurisdictions have also widely adopted increased penalties for 
illicit weapons use: penalties increase for gun usage in crimes, felons are widely barred 
 
223 This cultural worldview typology may explain why the Black Congressional Caucus split nearly evenly 
in supporting severe penalties for crack cocaine that had racially disproportionate incarceration effects; 
worldview types are likely not fully co-extensive with race.  See David A. Skansky, Cocaine, Race, and 
Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1283 (1995) (describing legislative history of the cocaine sentencing 
laws).  For an argument justifying punishing crack more harshly than power cocaine, see Steven D. Levitt 
& Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics (2005). 
224 Kahan et al., supra note 220, at 23; Kahan & Braman, supra note 220, at 1306-08. 
225 For example, raising the minimum drinking from 18 to 21, despite widespread violation, reduces 
drinking, and alcohol-related problems, in that age group.  See A.C. Wagenaar & T.L. Toomey, Effects of 
Minimum Drinking Age Laws: Review and Analyses of the Literature from 1960 to 2000, J. Studies on 
Alcohol, supp. no. 14, 206-225 (2002). 
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from owning guns, and violent crime sentences remain high.226 Those combinations of 
policies likely map out coherently in cultural cognition terms; they may imply a 
individualist-dominated approach to private liberties backed by a hierarchists’ concern 
about deviant, order-threatening abuse of those liberties in the form of vivid risks such as 
armed criminals (or drunk drivers or sexual predators).  Gambling fits the same story: 
more freedom from criminal and civil regulation for consensual transactions, but officials 
regulate abuses through criminal fraud227 and money laundering228 laws and prosecution 
of organized crime as well as with related regulatory schemes.  The decriminalization of 
much public profanity, of revealing or unconventional dress, and bans on unmarried 
cohabitation likely marks a coalition of individualistic and egalitarian worldviews.229 
These speculations are preliminary to be sure.  And we should not expect to be able 
explain a broad collection of laws perfectly as according perfectly public preferences 
even if these cultural types are accurate accounts of those preferences.  There may be no 
clear majority preference on a given issue but rather cycling pluralities on multiple 
options.230 And public preferences do not translate directly into legislation; they are 
mediated by legislative and other democratic processes, which open avenues for minority 
preferences to prevail, or for policy options to be presented and debated in ways that shift 
preferences.  Nonetheless, contemporary criminal law may well fit a coherent account 
built with the conceptual tools of insights such as cultural cognition, even as it fails by 
scholars’ normative standards of the harm principle, libertarianism, or a vision of rational 
sanction according to objective measures of risks and harms.  And by such an account, 
many features of criminal law may look less like overcriminalization. 
 
226 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics (Dec. 2004) (portion of offenders in prison for violent 
crimes grew from 47% in 1995 to 51% in 2004, while portion incarcerated for drug crimes declined from 
22% to 21% and for property crimes from 23% to 20%). 
227 See, e.g., Va. Code § 18.2-327 (defining criminal offense of winning at gambling through fraud). 
228 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (overturning conviction, due to improper jury 
instruction on mens rea issue, of a gambler who structured his debt payments to a Nevada casino to avoid 
federal reporting requirements under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) & 5324(3)). 
229 Likewise, scholars make compelling arguments that drug policies are deeply flawed, but cultural 
accounts may explain why democratic majorities often favor policies that seem suboptimal to experts.  See, 
e.g., Steven B. Duke & Albert C. Gross, America’s Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade Against 
Drugs (1993) (criticizing drug policy).  
230 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 137, at 1686 (discussing Condorcet paradox, which “casts doubt on 
the premise that a simple majority can in normal circumstances even be identified”). 
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V.  Overcriminalization and Criminal Justice’s Biggest Problems 
 Despite the constraint of democratic preferences, the facts remain that over the 
last several decades criminal codes’ overall growth outstripped their contraction.231 At 
the same time, incarceration rates have risen dramatically, and a range of much-discussed 
problems worsened, including excessive plea bargaining and incarceration, racial 
disparities, and small but significant problem of wrongful convictions.  If 
overcriminalization criticisms are really complaints about how we make and maintain 
criminal law—or put differently, about democratic governance of criminal law—then 
how much blame does the growth of criminal law share for this state of affairs? 
 Relatively little.  Consider three prominent sets of problems. 
A. Incarceration rates 
There is a wide scholarly consensus that American incarceration rates are 
excessive and racially skewed and that sentencing policies are overly rigid.232 Expansion 
of substantive criminal law deserves little blame for this.  The dramatic growth in 
incarceration rates is mostly of a function of new sentencing laws rather than new crimes, 
coupled with greater enforcement of mostly long-standing, familiar crimes, not outdated 
ones with little popular support. 
Data on state felony convictions suggest that convictions focus overwhelmingly 
on traditional crimes about which there is little criminalization debate.  In 2002, there 
were just over one million conviction felony convictions in state courts.  Eight-five 
percent of those were for traditional crimes of violence (murder, sexual assault, robbery 
and aggravated assault), property (burglary, car theft and other larceny or fraud offenses) 
or drugs.  The remaining fifteen percent mostly included uncontroversial nonviolent 
crimes such as receiving stolen property or vandalism.233 
231 See Robinson, supra note 18. 
232 On incarceration rates, see Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (3d ed. 2002), available at 
http:// www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/r166.pdf. On racial disparities, see, e.g., Marc Mauer, Race to 
Incarcerate 182-87 (1999); Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A Comparative Perspective 219-48 
(Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds. 1997). On rigidity of sentencing guidelines and other statutes, 
see, e.g., Kath Stith and Jose Cabranes, Fear of Judging (criticizing rigidity of pre-Booker federal 
sentencing guidelines); Paul Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a 
Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (2004). 
233 BJS, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2002, at tbls. 4.1, 4.3. 
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To be sure, these broad categories obscure some risks of overcriminalization.  
They lump together multiple definitions of theft, arson and other crimes that might cause 
the sorts of effects that scholars worry about, such as disparate sanctions for comparable 
offenders or excessively light proof burdens for prosecutors.234 Nonetheless, the data 
strongly suggest that pursuit of obscure, marginal or controversial crimes is a statistically 
negligible problem, at least at the felony level.  Occasional, outlier crimes—felony 
punishment for breaches of private fiduciary duties or of false statements under oath—are 
still legitimate causes for scholarly concern, but they are not substantial systemic 
problems, and they are concentrated in the federal system.235 
Thus, note this misleading correlation: we have an increase in the number of 
crimes and a corresponding increase in incarceration.  But virtually none of the 
incarceration increase of the last 25 years comes from the new substantive crimes added 
during that period; it comes from new punishment policies.236 The incarceration increase 
comes almost entirely because we’ve decided to punish longstanding crimes more 
harshly; punishment for newly created crimes seems to add a statistically insignificant 
increment to incarceration rates.  And Bernard Harcourt’s current work suggests that 
even recent incarceration rate increases are not over-incarceration, relative to rates in the 
first half of the twentieth century, if we aggregate prison and mental hospital 
confinement.  That combined measure of confinement was highest in the mid-twentieth 
century; current prison incarceration increases only substitute criminal confinement for 
the dramatic drop in institutionalization of the mentally ill, so that recent combined 
confinement measures merely match those of a half-century ago.237 Harcourt’s data 
 
234 Multiple statutes that criminalize prohibited conduct such as drug sales and arson under several 
definitions are also not distinctive to the United States.  For a description of various German drug and arson 
crimes, see Floyd Feeney, German and American Prosecutions: An Approach to Statistical Comparison 60-
64 (BJS publication, NCJ 166610 Feb. 1998). 
235 Federal prosecutions are more diverse, and overcriminalization is worse there in many respects.  Still, 85 
percent of federal cases included a violent-crime charge, and 36 percent included a drug trafficking charge; 
11.7% included fraud charges and 1.5% alleged regulatory offenses.  The smaller, latter two categories are 
the focus of complaints of over-expansive crimes that cover marginal wrongdoing, and presumably only a 
subset of each category is controversial.  See 2003 Sourcebook, supra note 4, at tbl. 5.17 (2001 data). 
236 The arguable exception might be drug crimes, especially if we count federal criminalization of state 
drug crimes as substantive expansion.  The same basic drugs were criminalized before incarceration rate 
increases, but some important alternations to those drug crime statutes, such as the federal crime of crack 
cocaine possession and distribution, see Sklansky, supra note 236, surely account for some portion of 
incarceration increases.  Still, these are not wholly new crimes nor outdated ones. 
237 See Harcourt, supra note 20, at 2-4, 15-28. 
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implies that recent punishment increases, in context, do not demonstrate an 
unprecedented “over” incarceration shift. 
B. Selective prosecution and racial disparities. 
Selective prosecution and racial disparities are also prominent, persistent 
problems, but here as well the increasing breadth of substantive law is a minimal factor.  
The causes of racial disparities are many.  One of the most significant is likely 
differences in ease and cost of investigation between, for example, street-based drug 
markets and trade that occurs more privately in homes and offices.238 Others may be 
racial profiling, bias in prosecutorial discretion, and (for the small percentage of cases 
that go to juries and for which the evidence is close) jury bias.239 Duplicate crime 
definitions have little or no effect on racial profiling, but profiling is facilitated by 
expansive codes—especially traffic codes, which give police grounds to stop most people 
(and thus anyone they choose) for minor infractions who are then investigated for major 
ones. 
But most of these disparities arise under offenses that are not plausible candidates 
for abolition and thus do not arise from overcriminalization.  Save for some petty traffic 
offenses—which, despite some movement toward decriminalization, remain the segment 
of state codes best described as overcriminalized—the list of crimes that facilitate this 
discretion and that we would be willing to decriminalize is probably minimal.  
Discretion, and bias in its use, is an inevitable risk under any statute.  Selective 
enforcement and disparities in outcomes occur even under crimes for which there is 
universal support—although one wonders if sentencing for those crimes would find more 
public disapproval if enforcement were more evenly distributed across race and class.  No 
one urges decriminalization of murder (though some oppose the death penalty for it), yet 
some of the strongest evidence of racial bias is arises from capital murder prosecutions.240 
238 Stuntz, Race, Crime and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795 (1998). 
239 David Baldus, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the post-Furman Era: An Empirical and 
Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1998); McClesky v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
240 See McClesky, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Baldus, supra note 239; David Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the 
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis (1990); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (calling death penalty “wantonly and so freakishly imposed”).  Selectivity and bias 
have much to do with design and administration of capital punishment but nothing to do with 
overcriminalization. 
54
Few oppose criminalizing cocaine distribution (though, again, many urge punishment 
reform), yet some of the most compelling data on racial disparities arise from 
enforcement of this prohibition.  Here again, a prominent part of this disparity problem is 
federal law.  Broad statutes (such as fraud offenses) and wide prosecutorial discretion 
raise the odds of selective enforcement.241 And federalization of conduct already covered 
by state offenses increases the odds of disparate sentencing outcomes, because federal 
penalties far exceed most state ones.242 On this point the critical scholarly consensus 
seems sound.  But in the overall problem of racially disparate prosecution and sentencing 
patterns, overcriminalization in state codes seems to play a small part. 
 C. Wrongful convictions and plea bargaining. 
A final pair of prominent issues is wrongful convictions and increasingly high 
rates of plea bargaining along with correspondingly shrinking numbers of trials.  
Overcriminalization seems to have no relation to the first, save to the extent it does to the 
second.  That is, the only factor scholars and advocates point to as a cause of wrongful 
convictions that might implicate overcriminalization is prosecutorial power to coerce 
risk-averse, innocent defendants into guilty pleas.243 
Expansive codes contain more offenses with varying penalties that prosecutors 
can leverage in bargaining.  Plea to crime X with a five-year sentence, or face trial on 
crimes X, Y, and Z with a much higher minimum sentence if you lose.244 This argument 
has some merit, but probably less than first appears.  A range of other factors drive plea 
bargaining and would likely push it to its current levels even if codes contained less 
substantive redundancy and criminalization of marginal conduct.  Drastic plea 
discounts—the difference between sentences after pleas and those after trial—do more to 
increase prosecutorial bargaining power than a wide array of substantive statutes, 
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especially those that plausibly could be abolished.245 The force of prosecutorial plea 
offers depends on the ability to obtain harsher sentences after trial.246 Caseload increases 
on prosecutors, defenders and judges without corresponding increases in resources 
encourage all those players to favor bargains over trial.247 (Ron Wright, however, in an 
insightful analysis of federal cases, finds pleas increase as prosecutorial resources 
increase.)248 Expansive criminal codes may play a role; they increase prosecutors’ ability 
to stack multiple charges on the same course of conduct and thereby have more to 
bargain with.  But in the routine run of cases, many of those charges do not arise from 
offense definitions that even most scholars (let alone legislators or voters) would find 
easy candidates for repeal; recall that most felons, especially in state systems, serve 
sentences for familiar violent, drug and property crimes.249 
Moreover, our best historical account of plea bargain practice makes little 
mention of expanding substantive codes as an explanation for bargaining’s rise.  George 
Fisher’s definitive study found plea bargaining grew from an almost non-existent practice 
to a dominant one over the nineteenth century largely due to rigid sentencing laws, not 
broad codes.  Mandatory sentences eliminate judicial discretion and allow prosecutors to 
control the discount for pleas over trials and thus bargaining first emerged in liquor cases, 
where sentences were determinate.250 Other changes supported bargaining’s growth—
caseload pressures on judges and prosecutors, and changing evidence rules that made trial 
(and trial testimony) more risky for defendants.251 But plea bargaining arose before 
codes started their expansive growth.  While more crimes add to prosecutors’ charge-
stacking options, it is the sentencing implications of those charges—whether they carry 
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mandatory penalties, and whether sentences on separate charges will merge run 
concurrently—that make charge-stacking and bargaining a powerful force. 
Again, the federal system is more suspect than the states.  Even post Booker,252 
federal sentences remain more rigid than states’ (mandatory-minimum statutes are 
unaffected by Booker), and the case for abolishing overbroad and redundant serious 
offenses is stronger there.  Even so, Wright’s detailed empirical analysis attributes to the 
expansive federal code no such effect.253 Moreover, the point remains for the vast bulk 
of criminal law, which occurs in state systems.  Leaner, more coherent substantive codes 
would likely have only modest effects prosecutorial bargaining power and practice; other 
factors would still drive much plea bargaining. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 There is no doubt that many state codes are overstuffed with redundant, outdated 
and trivial offenses, and the federal code surpasses the worse state offender.  But that 
does not mean the story of democratic construction of substantive criminal law is as bleak 
as many scholars suggest, nor are bloated codes’ effects as significant.  Little conduct is 
criminalized, and even less is enforced, that majorities think is wholly innocent.  And 
when majority preferences change about conduct that is criminalized, legislatures often 
find their way to repealing such provisions.  When a minority of them does not, courts 
sometimes do it for them, and prosecutors mostly make sure law-in-action matches those 
preferences even if law-on-the-books does not.  States vary in their capacity to reform 
their codes, but the glass is plausibly viewed as at least half full.  There are plenty of 
examples of states improving that capacity, especially through the design of legislative 
processes—framework laws and use of expert commissions—that point the way for more 
states to more effectively manage and monitor criminal law.   
Legislatures’ work on criminal law seems little worse than other perennial topics 
in which legislative products are open to criticism as wasteful, serving minority interests 
at the expense of common ones, or violating a normative ideal.  Think of parochial pork-
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barrel items in federal appropriations bills or specialized tax provisions that gradually 
clutter the tax code in the wake of its periodic reform.  Democratic lawmaking is messy 
and rarely accords with a single, coherent theory of how any policy—the tax code or 
criminal code, say—should be organized.  But Congress occasionally finds ways to 
improve these imperfect processes—framework laws are good examples—and a 
significant number of states are finding comparable ways to do so with regard to criminal 
lawmaking.  And if those sorts of procedural reforms improve legislative management of 
criminal law, then remaining problems are not so much criminal law politics and 
democracy generally but in significant part choices among particular, sub-constitutional 
mechanisms of political process, which are clearly amenable to reform. 
The full details of criminal law defy description within a coherent normative 
theory, but holding aside pockets of federal practice and some unenforced, mostly minor 
state laws, its broad sweep roughly accords with majoritarian preferences.  If this is true, 
criminal law’s substantive reach is not likely to undermine its public legitimacy; 
majorities seem to have little problem with many provisions scholars complain about.  
Other effects of criminal law’s haphazard growth—inconsistent terminology, publication 
of offenses outside the criminal code, varying punishments for similar crimes—are 
continuing issues.  But they are largely separate from the core concern of 
overcriminalization, namely that criminal law punishes conduct most people think is 
innocent, and that law’s substantive scope excessively enhances prosecutorial power. 
Criminal law, in short, is not as substantively broad—especially in its practical 
reach—as overcriminalization literature typically implies.  Nor are democratic processes 
as deeply and distinctively flawed on the construction of criminal law.  Legislatures have 
an undervalued history for reforming crime definitions, prosecutors constrain those 
offenses even more in practice, and procedural innovations show the possibility, and 
perhaps the promise, for improving legislative governance of criminal law. 
